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The ICTWSS Database: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 1960 and 2007

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The ICTWSS database covers four key elements of modern political economies in advanced capitalist societies: trade unionism, wage setting, state intervention and social pacts. The database contains annual data for 34 countries: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Canada; Cyprus; the Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Germany; Greece; Finland; France; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; the Netherlands; New Zealand; Malta; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Spain; Slovenia; Slovakia; Sweden; Switzerland; the United Kingdom; the United States; and it runs from 1960 till 2007. The 90 variables contained in this database are described in the codebook included in this text.

The part on social pacts was developed in the framework of the NEWGOV project, financed under the EU FP6 research framework, on “Distributive Politics, Learning and Reform: National Social Pacts”, directed by Sabina Avdagic, Martin Rhodes and myself. Our database contains information on the negotiation and signing of pacts, the actors involved, whether these were wage pacts or pacts dealing with other issues, whether they were broad or single-issue pacts. In addition the database covers the existence of bipartite agreements on wage and non-wage issues, distinguishing between agreements that are negotiated and implemented autonomously by trade unions and employers’ organisations, and agreements that depend on the support and sponsorship of the state. In addition the database contains information on the existence of bipartite and/or tripartite councils or bodies for social economic policy making, advice and forecasting, and the degree to which trade unions and employers’ organisations are routinely involved in the preparation of public policies in the social and economic domain. All data are newly collected based on data from the project and from various national sources and comparative studies. A separate textual database (**ICTWSS-Text**, available in March 2009) discusses the coding and locates the sources.

The part on wage setting focuses on union or bargaining coverage, extension of contracts, coordination, government intervention, minimum wage setting and union centralisation.

The data on union or bargaining coverage are from various national and comparative sources, including Traxler (1994), OECD (2004), EIRO (2002), Visser (2004), survey data for the US, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, as well as historical estimates from Ochel, 2001. Kenworthy (2001) is the key source for the coordination of wage setting scores, with my own data for Central and Eastern Europe and recent years added.

There are a few subtle differences in the wage coordination scale used here and the one used by Kenworthy (see codebook, *infra*) and for some years and countries my scores and his differ (these differences will be discussed in ICTWSS.txt). As the Kenworthy scale allows ranking from high to low, I have preferred his approach to the coding in Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel (2001). The five-point scale measuring government intervention was developed by Hassel (2006) though I have made two major changes, one to allow a distinction between (a) non-intervention but supporting and facilitating broad sectoral unions and agreements (the case of Germany); and (b) non-intervention while creating or upholding a legal framework that favours fragmented and company unionism and bargaining (the case of the UK). The other change is that the scale used here distinguishes between (a) interventions that impose by law a stop on free bargaining or a ceiling on its outcomes and (b) interventions by means of a social pact negotiated with the unions and employers for some *quid pro quo*. The data are from Hassel (2006), Golden and Lange (1996), Golden, Lange, and Wallerstein (2006), at <http://www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/> (version dated June 16, 2006), and my own updates for Central and Eastern Europe, New Zealand and recent years. I have reduced the 15-points Golde-Lange-Wallerstein (2006) scale to my five-point scale based, as suggested by Hassel, 2006 (see codebook, below).

Another key aspect of government intervention relates to minimum wage setting. Based on a study of the institutional aspects of minimum wage setting (does a mandatory exist in all or some parts of the economy; how do governments reach decisions; is there an index; what role do social partners play, etc.) I have developed a coding. The data are from the OECD and from various national sources, among others collected from EIRO.

There are two indicators for centralisation, one for bargaining centralisation, the other more specifically for the role of trade unions and taking into account both a vertical (authority of higher over lower units or actors) and horizontal (integration or concentration of units or actors) dimension. The indicator on bargaining centralisation measures, simply, the dominant level at which bargaining between employers and unions over wages takes place, distinguishing three levels (central, sectoral, local or company) and five combinations. The index for union centralisation follows the methodology proposed by Iversen (1999) and combines data on the concentration or fragmentation of trade unions with information on the division of authority in the union movement (Visser, 1990; Windmuller, 1975). The data are new and presented here for the first time (see below, and codebook).

In addition, the ICTWSS Database contains basic comparative information on the organisation, nature and extent of workplace representation (information, consultation or co-determination) of employees at the level of the employing organisation (firms,

enterprises and establishments). The data are from various national sources as well as from recent surveys of the Dublin Foundation and available through the EIRO website. On the organisation of unions and key bargaining units, indicated by the concentration or fragmentation of unions and confederations, and by the authority division between them, the main source on union concentration are Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) for Western Europe; EIRO (2003) and the database of the Institut des Sciences du Travail of the Université Catholique du Louvain on *les partenaires sociaux en Europe*, developed for the European Commission (<http://www.trav.ucl.ac.be/recherche>), Carley, 2004, and various sources as well as EIRO country reports for Eastern Europe, and Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2006) for non-European OECD countries. The data for the two five-point scales for confederal and union authority are mainly from Visser (1990) for Western Europe and the national (unpublished) reports for the DUES Handbook (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000) and from Golden, Lange and Wallerstein (2006) for non-European OECD Countries. The data for Central and Eastern Europe is from the UCL files and several national and comparative sources.

Finally, the part on trade union membership and union density comes from Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) for Western European countries, Visser, 1991, 1992, 1993 and 2006 for extensions to non-European countries, combined with recent administrative data on union organization and membership from the Dublin Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Carley, 2004) and from the European Social Survey (waves of 2002 and 2004) for countries in Eastern and Central Europe (for the sources and methods: R. Jowell and Central Coordinating Team (2003): European Social Survey 2002/2003. Technical Report. London: Centre for Comparative Social Surveys, City University, and <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>). All series have been updated till 2007 in this file. Sources and methodologies are described in Visser, 2006. The methodology followed is the same as in Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000), but when available (for instance in the US, UK, Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands) I have preferred household survey data for calculating 'net' union density rates. The database contains two series, one for gross membership (including members who are unemployed, self-employed or – the largest group – have retired from the labour market, and one for 'net' membership without these groups. The series on 'net' membership matches the data on the employed dependent labour force or 'wage and salary earners in employment' and is the one used for calculating union density rates (here defined as the share of union members in the employed dependent labour force). It is also the series best compared with survey data.

The labour force data are from the OECD (Labour Force Statistics, various years). In the case of countries not belonging to the OECD, the statistics are from Eurostat or, for the years before 1994 or 1995, from United Nations and World Bank statistical sources.

When data are interpolated, this has been written in red

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ICTWSS CODEBOOK (and variable description)

1] WCoord: coordination of wage bargaining

- 5 = economy-wide bargaining, based on a) enforceable agreements between the central organisations of unions and employers affecting the entire economy or entire private sector, or on b) government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling.
- 4 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) central organisations negotiate non-enforceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or b) key unions and employers associations set pattern for the entire economy.
- 3 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of central organizations and limited freedoms for company bargaining.
- 2 = mixed industry- and firm level bargaining, with weak enforceability of industry agreements
- 1 = none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level

*[Note: this classification is based on Kenworthy's 5-point classification of wage-setting coordination scores (Kenworthy, 2001a,b) and in most countries and years the scores are the same as his. The main difference is that except in the case of direct imposition of wage settlements or in the case of a ban on contract renewals (= score 5), I do not assume that the scale for government intervention in wage bargaining parallels that of wage coordination. Government intervention is taken up in the separate variable: **Govint** below].*

2] Govint: government intervention in wage bargaining

- 5 = the government imposes private sector wage settlements, places a ceiling on bargaining outcomes or suspends bargaining;
- 4 = the government participates directly in wage bargaining (tripartite bargaining, as in social pacts);
- 3 = the government influences wage bargaining outcomes indirectly through price-ceilings, indexation, tax measures, minimum wages, and/or public sector wages;
- 2 = the government influences wage bargaining by providing an institutional framework of consultation and information exchange, by conditional agreement to extend private sector agreements, and/or by providing a conflict resolution mechanism which links the settlement of disputes across the economy and/or allows the intervention of state arbitrators or Parliament;
- 1 = none of the above.

[Note: this coding is based on Hassel, 2005, p. 75, however with some changes: a) to make a difference between the case of social pacts or pact negotiations (= 4) and government imposition (= 5), which occurs when pact negotiations or agreements fail; b) to add the role of public sector wage setting (= 3, when public sector settlements are used as pattern setter for private sector wage developments), give more weight to the role of Parliaments or state arbitrators in the settling of disputes (= 2), and distinguish the case of non-interventionist governments that favour and facilitate broad sectoral organisations and negotiations (= 2), from the purer liberal or pluralist case of non-intervention or a liberal-pluralist regime that favours company unions and company and/or individual bargaining (= 1)].

3] Level: The dominant level(s) at which wage bargaining takes place

- 5 = national or central level
- 4 = national or central level, with additional sectoral / local or company bargaining
- 3 = sectoral or industry level
- 2 = sectoral or industry level, with additional local or company bargaining
- 1 = local or company bargaining

4] Ext: Mandatory or compulsory extension of collective agreements to non-organised firms

- 2 = legal* or organisational* provision extension available, regularly applied and affecting significant share of the workforce ($\geq 10\%$);
- 1 = legal provision for mandatory extension available, but not regularly or widely used ($< 10\%$);
- 0 = legal provision for mandatory extension not available.

[Note: * inclusive provisions based on de facto application of law by judges, as in Italy;
** inclusive provision based on compulsory membership of employers' organisations, as in the Austrian or Slovenian Chambers of Commerce]

5] Min_Wage: Minimum Wage Setting

- 0 = No national (cross-sectoral or inter-occupational) minimum wage;
- 1 = Minimum wages are set by collective agreement or tripartite wage boards in (some) sectors;
- 2 = Minimum wages are set by national (cross-sectoral or inter-occupational) agreement ("autonomous agreement") between unions and employers;
- 3 = National minimum wage is set by agreement (as in 2) but extended and made binding by law or Ministerial decree;
- 4 = National minimum wage is set through tripartite negotiations;
- 5 = National minimum wage is set on fixed rule (index-based minimum wage) after negotiations or consultations with by the social partners;
- 6 = National minimum wage is set by government, but after (non-binding) tripartite consultations;
- 7 = National minimum wage set by judges or expert committee, as in award-system;
- 8 = National minimum wage is set by government, without fixed rule.

[Note: this coding combines two scales: the existence (codes 2-8) or not (codes 0-1) of a national minimum wage, and the degree of government intervention and discretion in setting the minimum wage, or – reversely – the degree to which the government is bound in its decisions by unions and employers, and/or fixed rules].

6] PactNeg: A social pact is (publicly) being proposed by the government, the unions or the employers, and negotiations do take place in specified year

- 0 = no
- 1 = yes

7] PactSign: A (tripartite) social pact between the government, the unions and the employers, or between the government and the unions, is reached and signed in specified year

- 0 = no
 - 1 = yes
 - 2 = two pacts in same year
 - 3 = three pacts in same year
- etcetera*

[Note: social pacts are defines as "publicly announced formal policy contracts between the government and social partners over income, labour market or welfare policies that identify explicitly policy issues and targets, means to achieve them, and tasks and responsibilities of the signatories" (Avdagic, 2008: 11). This excludes a) tacit understandings or agreements that are not publicly announced, b) bilateral agreements between employers' organizations and trade unions that do not involve the government as negotiating party, even if implementation requires legislative action or government support .and c) so-called symbolic or declaratory pacts that do not commit the negotiating parties to specific tasks and responsibilities].

8] Trippact: The pact is contains commitments on policy of and is signed by all three signatory parties: unions, employers, and governments

0 = no
1 = yes

9] Hierarchy: The pact is signed by the unions and employers under pressure (of legal intervention, i.e. a “shadow of hierarcht”) by the government

0 = no
1 = yes

10] AgrSign: A (nation-wide) agreement between the central organisations of the trade unions and the employersis reached and signed in specified year

0 = no
1 = yes
2 = two agreements in same year
3 = three agreements in same year
etcetera

11] Aut-W: The (central) agreement is autonomously negotiated and implemented by the unions and the employers’ organisations, and includes a settlement on wages and/or the procedures for wage negotiations and dispute settlement

0 = no
1 = yes
2 = two agreements in same year
3 = three agreements in same year
etcetera

12] Aut-NW: The (central) agreement is autonomously negotiated and implemented by the unions and the employers’ organisations, and does only regard non-wage issues

0 = no
1 = yes
2 = two agreements in same year
3 = three agreements in same year
etcetera

13] Sponsor-W: The (central) agreement is negotiated by the unions and the employers’ organisations, and includes a settlement on wages and/or the procedures for wage negotiations and dispute settlement; however, the agreement is “sponsored” by the government, i.e. the agreement implements or transposes a particular law or public policy, and/or is dependent on legal intervention or public policy for its implementation.

0 = no
1 = yes
2 = two agreements in same year
3 = three agreements in same year
etcetera

14] Sponsor-NW: The (central) agreement is negotiated by the unions and the employers' organisations, and does only regard non-wage issues; however, the agreement is "sponsored" by the government, i.e. the agreement implements or transposes a particular law or public policy, and/or is dependent on legal intervention or public policy for its implementation

- 0 = no
 - 1 = yes
 - 2 = two agreements in same year
 - 3 = three agreements in same year
- etcetera*

15] All: All social pacts and agreements reached and signed in a given year (= sum of **PactSign** and **AgrSign**)

- 0 = none
 - 1 = one
 - 2 = two agreements in same year
 - 3 = three agreements in same year
- etcetera*

16] PactStructure: Pact or agreement is negotiated by all or some of the (possible) actors

- 0 = No pact or agreement
- 1 = Pact is negotiated by government, all (mainstream) union confederations and employers peak associations
- 2 = Pact is negotiated without major (mainstream) union(s)
- 3 = Pact is negotiated without major (mainstream) employers association(s).
- 4 = Pact is negotiated between unions and employers, but with heavy involvement of the government in negotiations ("shadow of hierarchy", threats, side-payments)
- 5 = Agreement is negotiated between unions and employers, but implemented through legislation (or prepared for legislation)
- 6 = Agreement is negotiated between unions and employers and implemented without government involvement or legislation ("autonomous agreement")

[On the strict definition of pacts as tripartite agreements – see above (Avdagic, 2008: 11) - , only 1-3, possibly also 4, constitute social pacts, whereas 5-6, whatever their importance, do not]

17] Pacttype: Type of social pact

- 0 = no pact
- 1 = narrow pact, dealing with one issue.
- 2 = broad pact, dealing with several issues, *including* wages or wage setting procedures.

18] Wage: the pact deals with wages

- 0 = No
- 1 = Yes

19] Non-wage: the pact does not deal with wages

- 0 = No
- 1 = Yes

20] Wage_Proc: pact or agreement is about procedure for wage setting: articulation of levels, length or synchronisation of agreements; negotiation or dispute settlement procedures, *but not* about actual wage rises or settlements.

0 = No
1 = Yes

21] Wage_Max: pact or agreement *also* contains a norm or ceiling regarding maximum wage rise

0 = No
1 = Yes

22] Pact_applies: Wage clause in pact or agreement applies in specified year (relevant for pacts or agreements covering more than one year, or those the implementation of which applies to the year(s) following the agreement

0 = No
1 = Yes

23] Tax_Budget: Pact or agreement contains, and/or is predicated on, concessions (or promises) regarding taxation and/or budgetary decisions

0 = No
1 = Yes

24] Work_Hrs: Pact or agreement contains, and/or is predicated on, concessions (or promises) regarding working hours

0 = No
1 = Yes

25] Empl_Pol Pact or agreement contains, and/or is predicated on, concessions (or promises) regarding employment policies (job creation, subsidies, etc.)

0 = No
1 = Yes

26] Empl_leg Pact or agreement contains, and/or is predicated on, concessions (or promises) regarding employment protection legislation (labour law)

0 = No
1 = Yes

27 Soc_Sec Pact or agreement contains, and/or is predicated on, concessions (or promises) regarding social security (unemployment, sickness, disability, family or children allowances)

0 = No
1 = Yes

28] Pensions Pact or agreement contains, and/or is predicated on, concessions (or promises) regarding (old age, retirement) pensions

0 = No
1 = Yes

29] Training Pact or agreement contains, and/or is predicated on, concessions (or promises) regarding vocational training

0 = No
1 = Yes

30] Union_rights Pact or agreement contains, and/or is predicated on, concessions (or promises) regarding unions (representation, recognition) rights, including employee representation, works councils, bargaining rights, etc.

0 = No
1 = Yes

31] Inst_conc. Pact or agreement sets up or changes nation-wide councils for concertation.

0 = no
1 = yes

32] TC: existence of a standard (institutionalized) tripartite council concerning social and economic policy (private sector).

1 = yes
0 = no

33] BC: existence of a standard (institutionalised) bipartite council of central or major union and employers organizations for purposes of wage setting, economic forecasting and/or conflict settlement.

1 = yes
0 = no

34] RI: Routine involvement of unions and employers' organisations in the preparation, decision and implementation of government's social and economic policy-making

2 = Unions and/or employers are routinely involved (through social councils, special committees or pre-parliamentary procedures) in the preparation of and decision-making over public policies in the social-economic domain;
1 = Unions and/or employers are occasionally involved (through social councils, special committees or pre-parliamentary procedures) in the preparation of and decision-making over public policies in the social-economic domain;
0 = Unions and/or employers are not or nearly never involved (through social councils, special committees or pre-parliamentary procedures) in the preparation of and decision-making over public policies in the social-economic domain.

35] WC: Works councils, or provision for the information, consultation and co-decision rights of employees in firms and establishments with 50 or more staff

2 = employee representation at the level of enterprises, firms or establishments (above the threshold of 50 employees) is mandatory, based on public law, and or assured on the basis of a enforceable central or basic agreement between the central organisations of trade unions and employers' associations; and coverage of eligible employees is 75 or more;
1 = employee representation at the level of enterprises, firms or establishments (above the threshold of 50 employees) is mandatory, based on public law, and or assured on the basis of a enforceable central or basic agreement between the central organisations of trade unions and employers' associations; but coverage is lower than 75 percent of eligible firms;
0 = employee representation at the level of enterprises or firms is absent or voluntary, and covers only some sectors or firms (less than 25 percent of firms above 50 staff threshold).

36] WC_struct: structure of works council or employee representation in firms, enterprises or establishments

- 3 = works council covers union and non-union members;
- 2 = works council covers union members only
- 1 = works council is supplementary – where unions do not exist
- 0 = employee representation in firm, enterprise or establishment is absent.

37] WC_rights: rights of works council or employee representation in firms, enterprises or establishments

- 3 = works council or employee representation body has co-decision rights regarding company economic policies (mergers and acquisition, investments and divestments, appointments to the board, etc (includes legal sanctions in case of breaching procedures for co-decision));
- 2 = works council or employee representation body has major consultation rights concerning social policies, including wage grading, training, job evaluation, procedures for recruitment and dismissal, et cetera (includes legal sanctions in case of breaching procedures for consultation);
- 1 = works council or employee representation body has information rights concerning company policy in social and economic matters (with weak or absent sanctions).
- 0 = employee representation in firm, enterprise or establishment is absent.

38] WC_negot: involvement of the works council in the negotiations of wages in the firm, enterprise, or establishment

- 2 = works council is formally involved in wage negotiations at the local level, mandated by law or delegated by the central or industry unions and employers' associations,
- 1 = works council or employee representation at firm level is barred by law or central agreement, but has nonetheless assumed an informal role in wage negotiations.
- 0 = employee representation in firm, enterprise or establishment is absent, or has no formal or informal role in wage negotiations.

39] Sector: Sectoral organisation of employers and unions, or joint bodies for negotiation, dispute settlement, training and/or recruitment (micro-management).

- 2 = sectoral organisations of employers and unions, or joint bodies for negotiation, dispute settlement, training and/or recruitment exist throughout the (market or private) economy;
- 1 = sectoral organisations of employers and unions, or joint bodies for negotiation, dispute settlement, training and/or recruitment (micro-management) exist in some sectors only, or are limited to the public sector;
- 0 = none of above.

40] Cfrep: confederation represents the affiliates politically, through lobbying or membership in tri- or bipartite bodies and councils.

- 2 = monopoly of representation in tripartite and bipartite bodies and councils
- 1 = representation in lobbying
- 0 = none of above, or confederations do not exist.

41] Cfappt: confederal (political) control over appointment of leaders of affiliates

- 2 = confederation appoints or has veto
- 1 = affiliates and confederations share control
- 0 = confederation has no control over appointment process

42] Cfagr: confederal involvement in wage agreements negotiated by its affiliate unions

(0-2) = $\sum^{(0 \rightarrow \text{lim}2)} \text{Aut_W} * 2 + \text{Pacts_Sign} + \text{Aut_NW} + \text{Sponsor_W} + \text{Sponsor_NW}$, with a maximum value of '2'

[the role of confederation, and implications for internal organisation, increase with the number of agreements negotiated, with autonomous agreements on wages, for which the confederation and its affiliates assume responsibility weighted double]

42] Cffund: confederal or joint strike fund from which member unions are reimbursed

2 = joint strike or resistance fund has significant size (≥ 50 percent of total union expenditure on official strikes)
1 = joint strike or resistance fund is limited (< 50 percent of total union expenditure on official strikes)
0 = no joint strike or resistance fund held by confederation

43] Cfveto: confederal power over strikes by affiliates

2 = all strikes need prior approval from confederation
1 = confederation can end strikes through central procedures of conflict settlement (arbitration)
0 = confederation has no power over strikes organised by its affiliates

44] Cfauthority: authority of confederation over its affiliates

(0-1): additive measure over Cfrep, Cfppt, Cfagr, Cffund and Cfveto, divided by maximum score (=10).

45] Unagr: union (affiliate) role in wage bargaining

2 = union negotiates enforceable agreement at sector level and has veto power over company agreements
1 = union negotiates agreements at sector level allowing enterprise or company branches to vary within limits
0 = union does not negotiate sector agreements.

47] Unappt: union (affiliate) control over appointment of workplace representatives

2 = union (affiliate) appoints workplace representatives
1 = union (affiliate) can veto candidates for workplace representation
0 = union (affiliate) has no control over appointment of workplace representatives

48] Unfin: union (affiliate) finances

2 = local and workplace branches are financed by the national union (affiliate)
1 = local and workplace branches have autonomous funds from direct member or employers contributions
0 = national union (affiliates) is dependent on financial contribution from constitutive branches and local (workplace) unions (national union is federation).

49] Unfund: union (affiliate) strike fund

2 = union (affiliate) has a large strike fund from which striking members are reimbursed at 75 percent of their base wage (without overtime pay and bonuses) for each day of strike.
1 = union (affiliate) has small strike funds from which some reimbursement (at less than 75 percent of the base wage) is guaranteed
0 = union (affiliate) has no strike fund

50] Unveto: union (affiliate) power over enterprise strikes

2 = union (affiliate) has veto over enterprise strikes

1 = union (affiliate) can end enterprise strikes through central procedure of conflict settlement (arbitration)

0 = union (affiliate) cannot veto or end enterprise strike

51] Unauthority: authority of union (affiliate) over their local or workplace branches and representatives.

(0-1): additive measure over Unagr, Unappt, Unfin, Unfund and Unveto, divided by maximum score (=10).

52] NCfs: Number of Confederations

(1- 8) = number of confederations (very small confederations are ignored and counted as part of the independent, autonomous or unaffiliated union membership; as a rule NCfs counts only central organisations, that have affiliate unions and membership that exceeds five percent of total union membership in the country)

52] ENCfs: Effective Number of Confederations

(1-8) = effective number of confederations, defined as the inverse of the Herfindahl-index or $1/H$. The Herfindahl (H) index is given by $H_{cf} = \sum_i^n (p_i^2)$, where p_i is the proportion of total membership organised by the i^{th} confederation and n is the total number of confederations.

[By discounting the weight of smaller confederations (achieved through the squaring method), the H_{cf} index conveys an idea of the actual degree of concentration at the central or peak level in a given country. The effective number of confederations ENCfs is equal to the probability that any two union members are in the same confederation and thus a measure of the degree of fragmentation or unity at the central (political) level (see Iversen, 1999: 53; Visser, 1990: 172).]

53] NAffCf1: Number of affiliates of confederation 1 (usually largest)

(1- ∞) = number of affiliated unions to confederation 1 (only national unions or federations)

54] ENAffCf1: Effective number of affiliates of confederation 1

(1- ∞) = effective number of affiliates, defined as the inverse of the Herfindahl-index or $1/H$. The Herfindahl (H) index is given by $H_{aff} = \sum_i^n (p_i^2)$, where p_i is the proportion of total membership organised by the i^{th} affiliate and n is the total number of affiliates.

[By discounting the weight of the many smaller affiliates (achieved through the squaring method), the H-index conveys an idea of the actual degree of concentration within the confederation. The effective number of affiliates in the first or main confederation ENAffCf1 is equal to the probability that any two union members are in the same union (affiliate) and thus a measure of the degree of fragmentation or unity in bargaining if that takes place at the sectoral level. We may also think of the effective number of unions or affiliates in the main confederation as the effective number of bargaining units (see Iversen, 1999: 53; Visser, 1990: 172). This number is indicative of the total number of the bargaining units in a country, especially if we assume that there is joint or majority bargaining in countries with unions divided between different union confederations. Based on this assumption we can dispense with the requirement to measure the effective number of unions in minority confederations Cf2-Cf8.]

55] MemCf1: Total membership of unions affiliated to confederation 1 (usually largest)

(1- ∞) = sum of members of affiliates in confederation 1

56-63] NAffCf2, 3, ... 8: Number of affiliates of confederation 2, 3, ... 8

(0- ∞) = number of affiliated unions to confederation 2-8 (only national unions or federations)

64-70] MemCf2, 3, ... 8: Total membership of unions affiliated to confederation 2, 3, ... 8

(0- ∞) = sum of members of affiliates in confederations 2-8

71] NindU: Number of Independent (Not-affiliated) Unions

(0- ∞) = number of unaffiliated or independent unions (only national unions or federations)

72] MindU: Membership of Independent Unions

(0- ∞) = sum of members of independent or unaffiliated unions

73] TNUnions: Total Number of Unions

(0- ∞) = $\sum \text{NAffCf}_{1-8} + \text{NindU}$

74] TUM: Total Union Membership

(1- ∞) = $\sum \text{MemCf}_{1-8} + \text{MindU}$

75] NUM: Net Union Membership

(1- ∞) = TUM minus union members outside the active, dependent and employed labour force (i.e. retired workers, independent workers, students, unemployed, see Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000; Visser, 1991, 2006).

75] WSEE: Wage and Salary Earners in Employment

(1- ∞) = employed wage and salary workers

76] UD: Union Density, net union membership as a proportion wage and salary earners in employment

(0-100) = $\text{NUM} * 100 / \text{WSEE}$

77] AdjCov: Bargaining (or Union) Coverage, adjusted

(0-100) = employees covered by wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining, expressed as percentage, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain (removing such groups from the employment count before dividing the number of covered employees over the total number of dependent workers in employment WSEE; see Traxler, 1994)

78] ShCf1: Membership share of Confederation 1

(0-1) = fraction p_1 of the membership in confederation 1 in the total membership (TUM)

79-85] ShCf2, 3, - 8: Membership share of Confederation 2, 3, - 8

(0-1) = fraction p_{2-8} of the membership in confederations 2 to 8 in the total membership (TUM)

86] Hcf: Membership concentration at central or confederal level (Herfindahl index at central or peak level)

(0-1) = given by $\sum_i^n (p_i^2)$, where p_i is the proportion of total membership organised by the i^{th} confederation and n is the total number of confederations.

[This variable measures the degree of concentration or fragmentation regarding bargaining or coordination agents at the central or national level.]

87] Haff: Membership concentration at the industry level, within confederations (Herfindahl index at sectoral level)

(0-1) = given by $\sum_i^n (p_i^2)$, where p_i is the proportion of total membership organised by the i^{th} affiliate and n is the total number of affiliates. $\sum_{Affl} n (p_i^2)$, where p denotes the fraction of total membership organised by the i^{th} affiliate and n is the total number of affiliates.

[This variable measures the degree of concentration or fragmentation regarding bargaining and/or coordination agents at the industry or occupational level]

88] AUTH: Summary measure of formal authority of unions regarding wage setting at peak and sectoral level

(0-1) = sum of **Cfauthority** and **Unauthority**, divided by maximum score (=20)

89] CONC: Summary measure of concentration of unions at peak and sectoral level

(0-1) = sum of **Hcf** and **Haff**, with a maximum of 1.

90] CENT: Summary measure of centralisation and coordination of union wage bargaining, taking into account both union authority and union concentration at multiple levels

(0-1) = given by $\sqrt{[(Cf_{authority} * H_{cf}) + (Aff_{authority} * H_{aff})]}$, weighting the degree of authority or vertical coordination in the union movement with the degree of union concentration or horizontal coordination, taking account of multiple levels at which bargaining can take place and assuming a non-zero division of union authority over different levels.

[The design of this indicator is inspired by Iversen's centralisation index, but is unlike Iversen's index based on an attempted measurement of union authority, rather than the level of bargaining persé (Visser, 1990). Unions can have a high level of authority both at the national and industry level, and no zero-division between these levels is assumed. Taking the square root serves to magnify the differences at the low end of this scale (Iversen, 1999: 53)]

Country codes

AS = Australia
AU = Austria
BE = Belgium
BG = Bulgaria
CA = Canada
CY = Cyprus (without Northern part)
CZ = Czech Republic (before 1993: Czechoslovakia)
DE = Germany (before 1990: West Germany)
DK = Denmark
EE = Estonia
EL = Greece
ES = Spain
FI = Finland
FR = France
HU = Hungary
IE = Republic of Ireland
IT = Italy
JA = Japan
MT = Malta
LT = Lithuania
LU = Luxembourg
LV = Latvia
NL = Netherlands
NO = Norway
NZ = New Zealand
PL = Poland
PT = Portugal
RO = Romania
SE = Sweden
SI = Slovenia
SK = Slovakia (before 1993: Czechoslovakia)
SZ = Switzerland
UK = United Kingdom
US = United States