




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
## An overview of women's work and employment in South Africa

*Maarten van Klaveren, Kea Tijdens,  
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# **An overview of women's work and employment in South Africa**

**Decisions for Life MDG3 Project  
Country Report no. 3**

**REVISED EDITION**

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# Management summary

This report provides information on South Africa on behalf of the implementation of the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project in that country. The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness amongst young female workers about their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family building and the work-family balance. This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of Amsterdam, for all 14 countries involved. It focuses on a gender analysis of work and employment.

*History (2.1.1).* After 1948, the authoritarian system of racial segregation under white minority dominance was formalised and intensified into “grand apartheid”. Skilled jobs were reserved for whites. Forced by the liberalisation struggle led by the ANC and under growing international pressure, in 1989 the apartheid regime pronounced its own death sentence. Since 1994, subsequent ANC administrations govern, first with a free-market economic strategy (GEAR), later with a stronger public sector orientation. From 2004 on, the GDP-per-person-employed growth pattern has been volatile.

*Governance (2.1.2).* After 1994, new social movements emerged, often addressing governmental failures. These movements, notably the women’s movement, maintain a complex relationship with the mainstream of the nationalist movement based on the anti-apartheid struggle. With the 2009 elections, women representation in parliament increased to 43%.

*Prospects (2.1.3).* The global economic and financial crisis has seriously hit the South African economy, with in the first half year of 2009 a fall in employment of 360,000 compared to a year earlier. The economy remains vulnerable, especially for falling global commodities demand.

*Communication (2.2).* In 2007, 42.3 million cell phones were in use, nine on each ten South Africans. In 2008 nearly 10% of the population used the Internet. Freedom of press is rather well-guaranteed. Female sources are rarely used for news broadcasting.

*The sectoral labour market structure – The long-term development (2.3.1).* After rapid growth in female employment from 1970 on, in 1995-2000 growth in the formal sector slowed down. Afterwards, it remained limited to commerce, finance and community and related services.

*The sectoral labour market structure – Formal and informal employment (2.3.2)* After growing quickly between 1995 and 2003, informal employment stabilized. In 2007, 27% of the total workforce, 38% of the African workforce and 34% of all employed women worked in the informal sector. Facing that about 30% of all formal sector workers does not have a written contract, and with many in temporary or casual labour, we

estimate for 2007 the share of core workers at 5.2 million, 38% of the labour force at large.

*The sectoral labour market structure – Unemployment (2.3.3).* Unemployment is especially high among African women and youngsters. Recently unemployment of African women (according to the official narrow definition) stood at 31%, and unemployment of young women at 52%. Nearly half of all unemployed women were new entrants to the labour market.

*Legislation (2.4.1).* South Africa has ratified the core ILO Labour Conventions, and its laws are non-discriminatory. Its labour legislation is highly codified and complicated.

*Labour relations (2.4.2).* 2008 estimates point at union densities of 24% over all employed, with 20% female density, or 31% in the formal sector against 3% in the informal sector. After a series of mergers, three union confederations are in place, COSATU, SACOTU and CONSAWU, all ITUC affiliates.

*The statutory minimum wage (2.5.1).* For nine vulnerable sectors, the Minister of Labour issues minimum wage determinations, with levels between 19 to 72% of average monthly wages in the respective sectors. The lowest minimum wages are set at 125% of the upper poverty line. Jointly with the minimum wage floors in collective agreements at industry level, 85% of the female labour force is covered by regulations laying down minimum wages. Non-compliance with minimum wages is generally a large problem.

*Poverty (2.5.2).* For 2000-06, it has been estimated that 43% of the population lived under the poverty line of USD 2 a day. Between 1995-2000, poverty grew among the African population. From 2002 on, with the expansion of social grants payments, poverty decreased. Especially where access to basic services is still limited, the burden of poverty falls heavily on women and girls. In 2006, South Africa ranked 125<sup>th</sup> on the human development index (HDI), 49 places below its GDP per capita rank.

*Population and fertility (2.6.1).* Due to the HIV/AIDS prevalence and to emigration, population growth rate is falling and, with 0.3% in 2008, quite low. The total fertility rate (2.4 children per woman) and the adolescent fertility rate (54 per 1,000) are also comparatively low.

*HIV/AIDS (2.6.2).* In 2007, about 5.7 million South African people lived with HIV, and the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate for those aged 15-49 was estimated at 18%. New HIV infections disproportionately affect young poor females, mostly African. Yet, progress is going on in the struggle against the pandemic; recently a decrease of HIV prevalence among the 15-24 of age has been found.

*Women's labour market share (2.6.3).* The overall labour participation rate of the 15-64 of age is only 57%, and for women 50%. The female share in the formal sector was in 2007 40%, and in the informal sector 55%. We estimate the current size of the target group of DECISIONS FOR LIFE for South Africa at

about 1.4 million girls and young women 15-29 of age working in urban areas in commercial services.

*Agriculture (2.6.4).* Large commercial enterprises dominate agriculture, and the employment share of agriculture is only about 8%. Thus, young women living in cities and trying to make a career rarely can rely on a “fall-back scenario” in which they can go back to their families living from agriculture.

*Mining and manufacturing (2.6.5).* Since the late 1990s, much manufacturing work have been outsourced and casualised, and manufacturing has become a less promising source of employment for women. The official figures indicate that still one-third of manufacturing employment is female.

*Commerce (2.6.6).* Though 1970-2007 wholesale and retail trade was the largest grower, 2007-'09 witnessed a serious fall in employment, especially hitting African women and men. In the 1990s practices of casualisation and externalisation of labour accelerated in the retail sector.

*Services (2.6.7).* Already since 1970, finance, insurance and other business services was the fastest growing industry. Between 2007 and April – June 2009, employment growth continued, and even speeded up for women. The government has labeled call centres and tourism especially promising sectors, and they seem to realise their potential.

*Government (2.6.8).* In the course of the 2000s budgetary constraints lowered employment prospects in the public sector. Analyses show monthly wages of public sector workers being higher than comparable wages in the private sector at large. They also learn that the public sector has moved faster to ensure wage equity in terms of gender and population group than the private sector.

*Literacy (2.7.1).* The adult literacy rate –those age 15 and over that can read and write—was in 1999-2006 88%. A gender gap is small or non-existent in literacy. In 2007, the literacy rate for 15-24 year-olds was set at 95%.

*Education of girls and young women (2.7.2).* Enrollment rates in all educational types are highest for girls. For 2007, net enrollment in primary education was 91%, with 92% for girls, though in 2000 both figures were 5%points higher. Also for 2007, gross enrollment in secondary education was 87%, with 89% for girls. For 2005, the enrollment rate for tertiary education was 15.5%, and 17% for young women.

*Female skill levels (2.7.3).* Whereas in 2009 50% of the female employed had completed secondary or tertiary education, the equivalent male share got stuck at 45.5%. Nearly 21% of employed women had completed their tertiary education, 4%points more than men. African women have on average also attained a higher educational level than African men, both among employed and unemployed.

*Wages (2.8.1).* Overall wage inequality grew between 1995 and 1998/2000, but reversed afterwards, though the earnings differences between population groups still grew. Since 2000, the gender pay gap has narrowed, but it is with 25-35% still wide. Higher education is very important in determining wages, with a vocational education, a degree and a postgraduate degree being most important. A vocational qualification was found to be more important for higher wages for females than for males. Average earnings in the formal sector are highest in utilities and transport etc., and lowest in wholesale and retail, and construction.

*Working conditions (2.8.2).* A number of occupational health and safety problems persist, like resistant tuberculosis among mine and health care workers. Working hours are quite long, with in 2009 25% of women and 35% of men working more than 45 hours per week.

*Indications of employers' HR practices (2.8.3).* The major challenge in HR policies is the need to move to employment equity, fair pay and skills development. Early accounts did not find much progress in this field. The adoption of new HR practices in large companies can combine with a strong union presence.

# 1. Introduction: The Decisions for Life project

The DECISIONS FOR LIFE project aims to raise awareness amongst young female workers about their employment opportunities and career possibilities, family building and the work-family balance. The lifetime decisions adolescent women face, determine not only their individual future, but also that of society: their choices are key to the demographic and workforce development of the nation.

DECISIONS FOR LIFE is awarded a MDG3 grant from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of its strategy to support the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals no 3 (MDG3): "Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women". DECISIONS FOR LIFE more specifically focuses on MDG3.5: "Promoting formal employment and equal opportunities at the labour market", which is one of the four MDG3 priority areas identified in Ministry's MDG3 Fund. DECISIONS FOR LIFE runs from October 2008 until June 2011 (See <http://www.wageindicator.org/main/projects/decisions-for-life>).

DECISIONS FOR LIFE focuses on 14 developing countries, notably Brazil, India, Indonesia, the CIS countries Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the southern African countries Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Project partners are International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Union Network International (UNI), WageIndicator Foundation, and University of Amsterdam/AIAS.

This report is part of the Inventories, to be made by the University of Amsterdam, for all 14 countries involved. These Inventories and the underlying gender analyses are listed in the Table. All reports will be posted at the project website. In this country report on South Africa the sequence of the sections differs from the table. The report covers mainly Activity nr 1.03, the Gender analysis regarding pay and working conditions (or, as Chapter 2 is called here, work and employment). Partly included (in section 2.4.1) is Activity 1.01, Inventories of national legislation; partly the analysis of national legislation has resulted in a separate product, the DecentWorkCheck for South Africa. Activity 1.02, Inventories of companies' regulations, will take place through a company survey. Preparations for Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number of lists, to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-specific questions and their analyses (Chapter 3). References can be found in Chapter 4; Chapter 5 gives more insight in the WageIndicator.

Table 1 Activities for DECISIONS FOR LIFE by the University of Amsterdam

Nr	Inventories
1.01	Inventories of national legislation
1.02	Inventories of companies' regulations
1.03	Gender analysis regarding pay and working conditions
1.03a	Gender analysis start-up design of off-line gender analyses inventory
1.03b	Gender analysis data-entry for off-line use inventories

## 2. Gender analysis regarding work and employment

### 2.1. Introduction: the general picture

#### 2.1.1. History

Rock paintings indicate the presence of a developed human culture in South Africa already 2,600 years ago. The European presence in South Africa was introduced by Portuguese and English explorers, before the Dutch colonization of the Cape of Good Hope began in 1652 under the Dutch East India Company (VOC) commander Jan van Riebeeck. The British first occupied the Cape in 1795. 'Wars of Dispossession' between Dutch, and later British, colonists and the indigenous Xhosa people followed. In 1834, the first Boer descendants of the Dutch settlers began their 'Great Trek', leading to the establishment of the two Boer republics, Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) ultimately led to the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). The defeat of the Boers (Afrikaners) was followed in 1910 by the establishment of the Union of South Africa.

Soon, 'Bantu' laws and regulations were woven into the fabric of the labour code for African workers, directing their labour according to the desires of white authority. Most drastic was the Natives Land Act of 1913, which gradually stripped the black African population of their right to own land, and forced them to remove to distant and infertile rural areas, the 'homelands', till over 80% of the population was restricted to 13% of the country's land area. Africans were deprived from the rights to engage in collective bargaining and to strike, while their unions could not obtain legal status. From 1948 on, when the Afrikaner whites elected the Nationalist Party to power, the successive NP governments under Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd and Vorster formalised and intensified the authoritarian system of racial segregation under white minority dominance into 'grand apartheid.' Throughout the 1960s South Africa became a fortress of white power and prosperity, experiencing one of the world's highest rates of economic growth. Based on the system of forced labour of expropriated blacks and their related extremely low wages, the country became leading in the exploitation of gold and other minerals and attracted massive Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), especially from the UK, the USA, France, and Germany. A vast bureaucracy controlled the system of job reservation, reserving almost all skilled jobs for white workers. In the 1960s and 1970s, the government used

the pass law system to push Africans out of the ‘white’ areas, resulting in over two million men circulating as migrants between their homes and urban employment, mostly deprived from normal family and social life, and millions of others commuting in packed buses and trains (Hepple 1971; Van Klaveren 1985, 1987; Meredith 2005).

The organized struggle for liberation had begun early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Milestones included the establishment of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1912 and that of the first black trade union in 1919. In the 1940s a militant mood grew among the Africans; in 1949 the ANC adopted its programme of action, including civil disobedience; the 1950s saw the Defiance Campaign against the pass laws, and the Congress of the People agreeing upon the Freedom Charter (1955). The 1960s marked a period of heavy oppression, with the Sharpeville and Langa massacres and the banning of black political organizations as well as the arrest of leaders like Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu. In the 1970s resistance politics were renewed, with the revived union movement and the 1973 Durban strikes; the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) led by Steve Biko; and the organization of black students (SASO), culminating in the 1976 Soweto uprising and consequently the student revolt – with such overcrowded townships becoming key grounds for political organisation. Between 1976 and 1981, the white government declared four homelands (Transkei, Bophutshatswana, Venda and Ciskei) ‘independent’, and about eight million Africans lost their South African citizenship.

The apartheid system came under increasing strain. By 1970 a serious shortage of skilled labour was hampering economic growth. Some white businessmen argued that scrapping the job reservation system and educating the black labour force was the only way out. The killing of Steve Biko and police shooting innocent schoolchildren fuelled the anti-apartheid movement worldwide. Though confronted with massive repression and arrests, the liberation struggle intensified throughout the 1980s with the formation of the two trade union confederations, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU, 1985) and National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU, 1986), successful local consumer boycotts, and growing strike activity. Against this backdrop the apartheid regime, from 1978 on led by P.W. Botha, was forced to review the issue of black employment. It abolished the job reservation system and set up commissions of enquiry, resulting in laws concerning occupational safety and conditions of employment. Labour relations legislation that followed began to regulate strike activity, union registration, membership and activity, but retained strong elements of racial discrimination. Occupational barring made way for job division or outright wage discrimination against African, Coloured and Asian/Indian workers (Brookes and Hinks 2004; Ryan 2007).

Botha's moves were too little and too late. Since 1980 the apartheid economy was stuck between low raw material prices in the world market and the sheer cost of an expanding military and police machinery, including the cost of supporting the UNITA and RENAMO rebels in their efforts to undermine the new Angolese and Mozambican governments. Inflation and foreign debt rose quickly, while exports, investment and real GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita fell from year to year. Under worldwide criticism of the apartheid system and at long last American and European sanctions, the migration stream of skilled Europeans dried up. Large American and British multinationals pulled out of the country. Left alone by their western colleagues with a bankrupt's estate, South African business tycoons realised they were approaching an abyss (Sampson 1987; Sampson 1999; Meredith 2005). Such were the conditions when, on 2 February 1990, Botha's successor F.W. de Klerk announced to lift the ban on the ANC and to release Nelson Mandela, and opened up the prospect of a democratic constitution and universal suffrage. In doing so, De Klerk pronounced the death sentence of apartheid (Meredith 2005, 436).

After four years of skirmishes and negotiations, a new interim constitution paved the way for national elections. The polls of 26 April 1994 resulted in a victory for the ANC and consequently in its majority rule, on the basis of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The new government was confronted with 'two nations'. For 1994, the UN Human Development Report (1996) indicated that, if white South Africa was treated as a separate country, its standard of living would rank 24<sup>th</sup> in the world, just below Spain's, while black South Africa on the same basis would rank 123<sup>rd</sup>. Moreover, after Mandela's inauguration as president the new government quickly found out that South Africa's economy was in dire straits, with a record budget deficit, hardly any foreign exchange reserves, and immense unemployment. Mandela defended the cautious and conservative economic policies of his government to the criticism of trade unionists and ANC comrades. However, in the course of the 1990s it became clear that the formal sector of the economy could absorb few new entrants to the labour market, and that only a small share of the black community escaped from poverty (Meredith 2005).

Soon, the social democratic RDP was abandoned in favour of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) economic strategy. In this orthodox restructuring program, adjustment to globalisation and integration in the world market, trade liberalisation and attracting FDI, were major policy targets (Carmody 2002). So were deregulation, privatisation of parastatal companies, and encouragement of the private sector—as then president Thabo Mbeki, from 1999 on Mandela's successor, stated: “(...) we must strive to create and strengthen a black capitalist class” (Meredith 2005, 666). The related policy of Black Economic

Empowerment (BEE), formalised by law and aiming at companies handing over ownership to black consortia, met growing criticism of the COSATU union confederation and black business, arguing that only a small, politically connected black elite (with sometimes white tycoons behind them) benefited and that BEE did little to nurture entrepreneurship (Freund 2007; Tangri and Southall 2008; FT 2007, 2009).

The only stated target of GEAR that has been reached is that of reducing the fiscal deficit (Aliber 2003, 476). Furthermore, as we will see, public infrastructure like the access to safe water, sanitation and housing has been improved. Budgetary constraints, however, growingly frustrate further improvement. Foreign direct investment (FDI) might have been important to compensate for the very low level of domestic savings that we already noted. In contrast, each year between 1994-2004 saw a net outflow of FDI from the country (UNCTAD 2005). The fundamental problem was and is that South African economic growth is near-jobless. Between 1995-2000, slow growth went hand in hand with small employment growth -- resulting in growing unemployment of the low-skilled Black population. A process of pro-poor (or shared) growth did not take off (Hoogeveen and Özler 2005, 13). Under pressure of campaigns of civil society organisations, including unions, the government introduced another economic strategy - the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA). Based on massive public works programmes (PWPs) and other government investment, attention to identified priority sectors for accelerated growth (notably tourism and call centres), and enlarged education and training efforts, the stated aim of ASGI-SA is to halve poverty and unemployment by 2014 (NALEDI 2004).

The years 2000-2003 showed rather abundant economic growth, driven by parallel booms of commodity prices on international markets and, internally, consumer spending fuelled by increasing social grants. In 2000, the GDP growth rate per person employed was 3.9%, in 2001 4.7%, in 2002 3.4% and in 2003 2.6%. A more volatile growth pattern characterized the years that followed: 2004 witnessed a negative growth rate of the GDP per person employed of -3.3%, followed by a recovery in 2005 of 5.0%, 2.6% growth in 2006, a fall of 0.2% in 2007 and 2.7% growth in 2008. From 2001-2006, the average yearly GDP growth per person employed was 2.5%, but the 2003-2008 average fell to 1.6% (*MDG Indicator 1.4*, derived from UN MDG Indicators) – lagging nearly 2%points behind comparable countries (peers) (Eyraud 2009). With (PPP) USD 9,087 yearly in 2006, the South African per capita GDP in the world ranked 76<sup>th</sup> of 179 countries. A huge gap remained between the estimated average male income of USD 12,637 and the average female income of only USD 5,647 (UNDP 2008a). Thus, the 2006 ratio of the average female to male income was 0.45. Basically, this gap is caused by the continuous existence of ‘two nations’ (though, as we will see, there are

also more subtle mechanisms at hand). The South African labour market is highly segmented, with a high-skill tier characterized by a tight demand for white males and to a lesser extent females, while the low-skill tier displays an over-supply of African males and females.

The ANC has remained the majority party in subsequent national elections. The last 15 years have been marked by the introduction of a new constitution and extensive law reforms. In September 2008, after the resignation of President Thabo Mbeki; the April 2009 general elections brought Jacob Zuma as his successor in power. ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and COSATU continued their political alliance. The ANC Election Manifesto adopted five priority areas: decent work, education, health, (fighting) crime, and rural development.

### **2.1.2. Governance**

In the aftermath of the April 1994 elections, collaborative relations between state and civil society came to dominate. Corporatist institutions like the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) were established, and non-governmental and community-based organisations (NGOs and CBOs) were provided representation in this forum through the establishment of a development chamber. Notably in the late 1990s many new social movements emerged, most of them seeking to challenge the emerging pro-growth consensus and to improve the situation of the poor in manifold ways; examples are the Anti-Eviction Campaign (2000) and the Landless People's Movement (2001). Others, like the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC, 1998) and the Education Rights Project (2002), addressed governmental failures in delivering health and education facilities. In and through these struggles, researchers concluded in 2006, the state has growingly engaged with civil society, though they also point at authoritarian features in state behaviour (Ballard *et al* 2006). The shift, in the 2000s, towards more pro-poor economic policies of the government may be partly due to the role of social movements (Padayachee and Valodia 2008). As many of these movements maintain a complex and often tense relationship with the mainstream of the nationalist movement based on the anti-apartheid struggle, this is definitely true for the South African women's movement. Women's organizations cover a wide spectrum from organizations with weak associational autonomy within broader struggles against oppression, like the ANC Women's League, to organizations like the United Women's Organization (UWO) and the Women's National Coalition (WNC) undertaking more independent action (Hassim 2006).

The representation of women in politics is a major issue in the country. The general elections of July 15, 2009, resulted in an increase of women representation in parliament to 43%, 9% up compared to the 2004 general elections and taking the fourth place worldwide in this respect.<sup>1</sup> An analysis of the role of gender in the 2009 elections by the GenderLinks and Gender and Media Southern Africa (GEMSA) networks argues that this outcome has largely been achieved as a result of the commitment by the ANC to the 50/50 gender principle (Morna *et al* 2009). The networks found a number of positive developments, for example: women comprised 55% of those registered to vote; 41% of the newly appointed ministers are women; of the 14 ministries headed by women, eight are in non-traditional sectors; the election promoted unprecedented media debate in previously no-go areas, for example as to what extent the personal is political. Concerns raised include facts that the female share in deputy ministerial posts has fallen considerably; that the leadership in parliament is now heavily male dominated; that the main opposition party, Democratic Alliance (DA), despite being led by a woman (Helen Zille), remains averse to quotas and has formed a 75% male cabinet in the East Cape, and that ANC and DA in and after their campaigns used sexist slurs for cheap political point scoring.

The networks report their particular concern of the weak state of the National Gender Machinery. Previously, it is argued, the Office of the Status of Women resided in the presidency, where it could perform a cross-cutting function. President Zuma has announced a Ministry of Women, Youth, Children and Disability, in line with other line functions. This proposal is regarded as problematic, especially because of the combination of women's and children's affairs (Lowe Morna *et al* 2009, 6). The South African leg of the MDG3 campaign has been launched in April 2008 in Cape Town (Sowetan 2008). The first MDG3 workshop in South Africa targeted gender-based violence (IPS Africa website). As far as we could trace, the South African government did not speak explicitly in favour of the MDG3 campaign, most likely as it may regard the attainment of MDG3 goals in line with its policies regarding the empowerment of women.

Over 2008, the US Dept of State reported that the South African government generally respected the human rights of its citizens, but it was added that the government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and local media reported the following serious human rights problems: police use of excessive force against suspects and detainees, which resulted in deaths and injuries; vigilante and mob violence; abuse of prisoners, including beatings and rape, and severe overcrowding of prisons; lengthy delays in trials and

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1 Thus coming closer to the targets set by the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development for achieving 50% in all areas of decision-making by 2015. The campaign for the adoption, ratification and implementation of the SADC Protocol is run by the Southern African Gender Protocol Alliance, a collective of over 40 national and regional gender NGOs (see Genderlinks website).

prolonged pretrial detention; forcible dispersal of demonstrations; pervasive violence against women and children and societal discrimination against women and persons with disabilities; trafficking in persons; violence resulting from racial and ethnic tensions and conflicts with foreigners; and child labour, including forced child labour and child prostitution. These problems were extensively documented (US Dept of State 2009a). Indeed, Amnesty International reported over 2008 that police responded to a number of public protests against poverty and unemployment with excessive force and arbitrary arrests. The rights of non-nationals held in police and immigration detention continued to be abused and asylum-seekers faced barriers in accessing asylum determination procedures. Violence against women, including rape, was said to be prevalent and barriers to access to protection and justice persisted (website Amnesty International). Though between 2004-2007 rape *as reported* (!) to the SAPS, the South African Police Service, decreased by 12%, the level of gender-based violence (rape in 2007: 75.6 per 100,000 of the population -- SAPS website, category rape) remains extremely high in international perspective. The female homicide rate is six times the global average, and 50% of these women are killed by partners. 28% of men admit to have raped (The Lancet 2009).

### 2.1.3. Prospects

The global economic and financial crisis has seriously hit the South African economy. During the first quarter of 2009, South Africa's annualised GDP fell by no less than 6.4%, especially due to decreasing sales of manufacturing and mining (SSA 2009c). In the first half year of 2009, nearly a quarter of million jobs were shed in elementary occupations, mainly in these two sectors. In total, employment fell by 360,000 compared to a year earlier. The number of employed men fell by 300,000, the number of employed women by 60,000 – meaning that by gender the number of unemployed became at par, after a long period with more female than male unemployed. However, the number of unemployed women even fell, by 140,000, whereas 150,000 unemployed men, mainly 'job losers', were added. Obviously large numbers of women and men –but relatively more women-- withdrew from the labour market and/or were labeled 'discouraged work-seeker'. Between April-June 2008 and April-June 2009, the number of such discouraged work-seekers grew by 440,000 (220,000 women and 220,000 men) and the incidence of not economically active increased by 285,000 (150,000 women and 135,000 men) – among which an increase of 156,000 home-makers. At the same time, there was a shake-out of 550,000 informally employed, among men (minus 13%) and women (minus 9%) as well as across all age groups (authors' calculations, based on SSA 2009b and LFS data put at the disposal of AIAS by Statistics South Africa).

Till mid-2009, the burden of the crisis in terms of employment fell nearly exclusively on Blacks Africans: amongst them, the number of employed fell by 370,000. In 2008-09 the racial differences in unemployment rates became even more marked, notwithstanding the withdrawal effects of the current crisis. Whereas the overall unemployment rate (according to the official, narrow definition) in April-June 2009 was 23.6%, African workers were confronted with 27.9% unemployment as against 19.5% for Coloureds, 11.3% for Indians/Asians and 4.6% for Whites (all figures: SSA 2009b). Moreover, the unexpected lift of inflation in 2008—officially 11.5%, with food and transport price inflation much higher—has resulted in real wage losses. Trenton Elsley of Labour Research Services (LRS) has calculated that average workers in 2008 lost about 3% of their purchasing power (Paton and Naidoo 2009). The widespread strikes and social unrest in South Africa in mid-2009 have to be projected against the backdrop of these and related developments.

Since April 2009, nearly all leading economists and international institutions have been growingly pessimistic about the prospects of developing countries, including South-Africa, confronted with the crisis. A World Bank research note as of that month clearly states: “The global economic crisis is exposing households in virtually all developing countries to increased risk of poverty and hardship”, adding “While in the short-run, the non-poor may be the most affected by the crisis, experience from past economic and financial crises suggests that the adverse impacts are likely to spread in the medium-term to poor households.” The note ranks South-Africa among the 40 or so developing countries with high exposure to the poverty effects of the crisis, be it that according to the World Bank experts the country’s budget leaves substantial room for additional funding domestically and from abroad without jeopardizing macroeconomic stability or debt sustainability (Cord *et al* 2009). This position has enabled an expansive fiscal policy to combat the crisis. While this may be a strong side of the government’s answer, the weak side of the country undoubtedly is its reliance on exports, which account for nearly two-thirds of the GDP. Thus, diminishing global demand and falling commodities prices may take a severe toll on the economy (Ali 2009). In this process, structural weaknesses in the South African economy, notably the underperformance of investment—both internal as from abroad—and the low rate of private saving (Eynaoud 2009), will most likely come out as more pronounced and may hamper a recovery. Under these conditions, meeting the MDG employment goals for 2015 will be a near-impossibility; “In order to meet these goals, around 700,000 jobs are to be created per annum”, bank economist Shireen Darmalingam recently commented (IOL News 2009).

Societal prospects in South Africa look rather gloomy in the face of the thin line between violence and political protest that seems to have left in the country. In July 2009, it has been observed by Adele Kirsten, executive director of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV), that in the depths of an unusually cold winter, the poor, feeling increasingly marginalized while expecting to find representation and sympathy for their plight, and the newly elected Zuma government seemingly unwilling to listen, are seeing protest as the only viable alternative. "It's like violence is the only thing the government listens to," Kirsten concluded. Another expert, Loren Landau, Director of the Forced Migration Studies Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand, commented: "What's going on now reflects two governance challenges that have gone unaddressed for too long: the first is less about service delivery than about managing expectations, and encouraging people to express their grievances (legitimate or otherwise) peacefully through community or political institutions." The second concerned the treatment of non-nationals, and a growing fear that violent protesters would increasingly target foreigners, often blamed for 'stealing' jobs, women and houses. Landau argues that the xenophobic violence that swept through South Africa in 2008 --killing at least 62 people and displacing 100,000 others- would return if nothing was done to address its root causes (UN IRIN 2009).

## 2.2. Communications

Adequate communication facilities are absolutely essential for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE project. In South Africa, fixed telephone lines were in 2007 4.6 million in numbers, of which the bulk in urban areas, which means nearly one fixed line on each 10 South Africans. As everywhere in Africa, cellular phones have become much more widespread, with in 2007 already 42.3 million cell phones in use, implying nine of these phones on each 10 South African inhabitants. Most of the subscribers are in the pre-paid category. The combined 'teledensity' of jointly fixed and cell phones is one on each member of the population. The telephone system is generally assessed as the best developed and most modern in Africa, but tariffs are high by international comparison and clearly a substantial burden for the poor (CIA World Factbook; Open Society Foundation 2007, 168-171, 176). In 1996, TELKOM, the parastatal telecom company, was partially privatised and entered into a consortium with private companies. In exchange for a five-year period of monopoly, TELKOM assumed an obligation to facilitate network modernisation and expansion into unserved areas. Yet, fixed-line prices spiralled and for poorer individuals and communities fixed lines remained out of reach. In fact, the limitations of the fixed-line network impacted significantly on the roll-out of broadband

services and the spread of cell phones (Open Society Foundation 2007, 171). The renewed TELKOM monopoly was breached in 2005, but has interlocking interests with the black empowered owners of the three call phone companies (Freund 2007).

Internet coverage in South Africa has reached, in global perspective, medium-range level. In December 2008 the country was estimated to have 4,590,000 Internet users,<sup>2</sup> or 9.4% of the population. Moreover, by September 2008 there were 378,000 broadband Internet subscribers (website Internetworldstats). In December 2007, the country had the very large number of 1,197,088 internet hosts -- 65% of Africa's total, against 5% of the population of the continent (website The Internet in Africa).

According to the South African Advertising Research Foundation, print media in 2008 reached 46% of the population. Nevertheless, the majority received news through radio broadcasts from the government-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and community radio stations. The SABC broadcasts in the country's 11 official languages; it owns and controls the majority of television and radio outlets. In 2008, the SABC signal reached 92% of the population, with a viewership share of 66% over the age of 16. SABC estimated that 75% of its audience was black, 12% white, 10% coloured, and 3% Indian (US Dept of State 2009b). A recent research report raised concerns on a culture in SABC of self-censorship as well as on board members trying to interfere in the daily operations of SABC. The report confirmed worries of the SABC management concerning funding, a continuation of its situation under apartheid, with the vast majority of the Corporation's funds coming from advertising – bemoaning the effects on the depth and length of news broadcasting (Open Society Foundation 2007, 107, 112-8).

Low power, nonprofit community radio stations continued to play an important role in informing the mostly rural public; however, they often had difficulty producing adequate content and maintaining staff. Government broadcast regulators regularly issued new community radio licenses and withdrew others for noncompliance with the terms of issuance. Privately owned E.tv was the second largest channel in the country with a terrestrial signal reaching 81% of the population. It was also the most-viewed English language channel with a viewership of 38% over the age of 16. E.tv estimated that 70% of its audience is black, with the highest growth segment being viewers from the black middle class; 13% is white, 13% coloured, and 4% Indian (US Dept of State 2009). Unfortunately, recent figures on access to the mass media by gender are lacking.

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2 The CIA World Factbook mentions for 2005 already 5.1 million internet users.

From 1997 on, the Universal Service Agency (USA), a state-related institution, rolled out Community Telecentres in under-serviced areas, providing access to basic electronic services like telephones, computers, faxes and copying facilities. The Community Telecentres met a number of organizational problems as well as lack of signal coverage. In 2006, USA claimed the existence of 133 telecentres countrywide; most likely about two of three may have been fully functional. Besides, in 2005 71 Multi-Purpose Community Centre (MPCC) telecentres were in existence in rural areas. Accessibility for the black population depends first and foremost on the availability of public transport (Open Society Foundation 2007, 159-161, 197).

Concerning the freedom of press, the US Dept of State reported over 2008: "The constitution and law provide for freedom of speech and of the press, and the government generally respected these rights. Individuals criticized the government both publicly and privately without reprisal. However, several apartheid era laws that remained in force posed a potential threat to media independence (...) High ranking government and political officials on occasion reacted sharply to media criticism and accused black journalists of disloyalty and white journalists of racism. Some journalists believed that the government's sensitivity to criticism caused self censorship in the media." It can be added that there are no government restrictions on access to the Internet or reports that the government monitored e-mail or Internet chat rooms. Individuals and groups could engage in peaceful expression of views via the Internet, including by e-mail (US Dept of State 2009a). News content analysis in 2006 for seven radio stations and SABC and e.tv TV stations reached rather positive outcomes. Over 96% of all items monitored were fairly reported, thus challenging views that notably the SABC is biased in favour of government, ANC and/or employers. According to the researchers, 98% of all stories across the media monitored provided the essential context and facts. Yet, they also noted a lack of in-depth information, like in covering human rights issues. Of great concern were the low levels of female sources accessed (Open Society Foundation 2007, 130-3, 140). Analysis of the media coverage of the 2009 elections confirmed this picture, with women constituting a mere 24% of news sources (MMA, cited in Morna *et al* 2009, 35). Within the union movement, there seems quite some concern about the rather low union profile in the audiovisual media (cf. Ndungu 2007).

## 2.3. The sectoral labour market structure

### 2.3.1. The long-term development

Table 2 shows the long-term development of employment in South Africa.<sup>3</sup> Combined with earlier Census data, a rapid growth of female labour market participation can be traced for the 1960s and between 1995 and 2000. In 1960 women (excluding domestic workers) accounted for 23% of the labour force in South Africa (Casale and Posel 2002, 158). By 1970 this share was 32%, in 1995 34%, to stabilize at about 41% from 2000 on (including domestic workers at 44%).<sup>4</sup> The table shows that –leaving out domestic workers-- between 1970 and 2000 employment increased by 46%, from about 7.5 million to just over 11 million. While in these three decades the growth for men was 33%, female employment grew by no less than 129%. After the end of apartheid, between 1995 and 2001 about 3.2 million women became economically active (broadly defined), partly in wage employment, yet more than half of them ‘making work’ for themselves in the informal sector (Casale and Posel 2002; Casale 2004). Men followed suit, with in the early 2000s some hundreds of thousands moving into self-employment (Kingdon and Knight 2007). Indeed, in the 2000s the growth pattern by gender reversed. From 2000 to 2007 employment growth was quite modest, 10.2% in total, but with 7.6% female employment grew even slower than men’s 11.4%. As said, recently the worldwide crisis hit the South African economy seriously. From September 2007 to April-June 2009, female employment fell by 0.8% (to 5,973,000 persons) and male employment even by 2.1% (to 7,397,000 -- SSA 2009b).

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3 Long-term employment trends in South Africa are rather difficult to disentangle because of changes in definitions and in coverage of both the Census and the October Household Survey (OHS) as of 1993, as well as the introduction of a new household survey, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) in 2000. Such changes have had negative implications for the comparability over time of developments in the female labour force (Casale and Posel 2002, 160-1).

4 In April-June 2009, following the decrease in notably male employment between 2007-2009, the female share nearly reached 45% (SSA 2009b).

Table 2 Employment\*) by industry and gender, South Africa, 1970 – 2007, x 1,000 headcount (aged 15-64), September

	1970			2000			2007		
	M	F	tot.	M	F	tot.	M	F	tot.
1. Agriculture, fishing etc.	1,593	889	2,482	819	543	1,362	498	272	770
2. Mining	674	7	680	417	14	431	299	24	323
3. Manufacturing	811	215	1,025	1,039	661	1,754	1,304	637	1,941
4. Utilities	45	2	47	67	12	79	61	23	84
5. Construction	464	12	476	652	57	709	959	135	1,093
6. Wholesale and retail trade **)	513	195	708	1,411	1,484	2,896	1,663	1,747	3,410
7. Transport, storage, commun.	310	28	338	585	100	684	577	157	734
8. Finance, insurance, business	115	75	190	609	412	1,021	842	605	1,447
9. Community, social, pers.serv.	585	1,011	1,596	883	1,220	2,103	1,062	1,478	2,540
10. Domestic workers	-	-	-	234	1,036	1,297	323	943	1,266
11. Total	5,109	2,433	7,542	6,770	5,566	12,336	7,558	6,020	13,609
12. Total excl. 10 and 11	5,109	2,433	7,542	6,536	4,530	11,039	7,235	5,077	12,343
%services ((6+7+8+ 9) : 12) x 100	30%	54%	38%	53%	71%	61%	57%	78%	66%

Sources: 1970: *Bhorat 2000, 445*; 2000 and 2007: *Statistics South Africa 2009a*

\*) *employers, employees and self-employed<sup>5</sup>*

\*\*\*) *incl. repair of motor vehicles, motor cycles and personal and household goods; hotels and restaurants*

Concerning industries, between 1970-2007 the largest grower in employed numbers for men and women equally has been wholesale and retail trade (including the repair activities and hotels and restaurants), but this ended abruptly in the period April – June 2007 to April – June 2009 with a drop in employment of 13%, while the decrease for women was even 16% (men 10%). Moreover, percent-wise employment in finance, insurance and other business grew even quicker – again, for men and women alike—as well as continued to grow in 2007-'09, by 18%, with 29% growth for women (and 10% for men -- SSA 2009b). In 1970-2000 the female shares increased in all industries except in agriculture and in community, social and personal services. In the latter industry the male labour force showed an astonishingly large growth. Between 2000-2007 the female shares grew everywhere except in manufacturing; here, employment initially increased for both sexes, but fell after 2000 for women. The two primary sectors (agriculture and fishing etc. and mining) showed a large drop in employment, though it should be noted that the 1970 figure includes both commercial agriculture and small-scale agriculture and that the 2000 and 2007 figures for domestic workers may hide about 300,000 persons mainly living on subsistence agriculture. Yet, the decrease in non-subsistence agricultural employment remains considerable; before 2000 this drop has been especially detrimental for African men (Bhorat 2000, 444-5), in the 2000s for African men and women alike. As the last row of the table shows, South Africa has made the transition to a service economy, with most recently two-thirds of employment

5 South African labour force statistics do not systematically provide (sub)divisions by employment status. In April – June 2009, 85% of all employed women were employee (men: 84%), 3% employer (men: 7.5%), 11% own-account worker (men: 8%), and 1.5% (men: 0.5%) unpaid household member (SSA 2009b, 14).

in services (in its wide sense, including the public sector: rows 6, 7, 8 and 9). The services industry already dominated female employment in 1970, by then making up 54% of the female labour force and growing to even 78% in 2007 (and to 79.5% in April – June 2009), and it finally did with male employment: in 2007 as well as in 2009 services accounted for 57% of the male labour force.

### 2.3.2. Formal and informal employment

We now turn to informal employment. While for quite some time there was no clear definition in South Africa of ‘informal sector’, workers in domestic service, casual wage employment and self-employment have mostly been included. The apartheid system repressed the informal activities of black South Africans. Even after 1994, when many restrictions were lifted, there were lingering licensing controls and restrictive by-laws in many urban centres. After the end of apartheid, governmental business support concerning crime prevention, infrastructure, business assistance, credit and training facilities neglected the informal sector (Kingdon and Knight 2004, 403-4). Jointly with the restrictions and the disempowerment of Africans under apartheid inhibiting the development of entrepreneurial skills and social networks, this may explain why the share of the informal sector in South Africa’s labour force remained an outlier compared to the much larger share in the other sub-Saharan countries (Kingdon and Knight 2007, 824).

In the run-up to the 2004 national elections, the government claimed that “the economy created two million net new jobs since 1995”. A reconsideration of this claim clarifies that less than 40% of the total increase in employment of 2.2 million was in wage employment in the formal sector (Casale *et al* 2004, 10). Indeed, recently revised time series of Statistics South Africa suggest that between 1994 and 2000 informal labour has spread widely. They indicate that in 2000 the informal sector absorbed about 35% of the labour force. In 2007, however, this proportion had decreased to 27%. The use of an alternative definition of ‘informal’ does not change this picture. It has been argued that the growth, against all odds, of the informal sector was a sign of the failure of the formal wage sector to create enough jobs for a rapidly growing labour supply. The researchers in question found for the period 1995-2003 labour supply (or ‘broad labour force’) growing yearly by 4.8%, while wage employment only expanded by 1.3% per year. By contrast, self-employment grew annually by 11.2% (Heintz and Posel 2008).

The development of earnings may serve as additional proof for the “failure of the wage sector” thesis. While in 1997-2003 real wages in the formal sector decreased by 0.5% per year, at the same time real incomes in the informal sector fell much more, by 7.8% yearly. And to use another yardstick: in 2003 42% of the informal self-employed earned less than the USD 2 a day poverty line, as against 19% of all employed

(Kingdon and Knight 2007, 822; Casale *et al* 2004, 12, 18). By the end of this period, in 2003, 60% of those in the informal economy had monthly earnings lower than R1,101, as well as 93% of the –separately counted-- domestic workers, against a quarter of those in formal employment (derived from ALRN 2004, 20). Moreover, in the current crisis the vulnerability of informal work is emphasized. We already noted that between April-June 2008 and April-June 2009, the number of informally employed fell by 550,000. Especially the young men and women aged 15-25 and the men aged 55-64 were hit, with employment losses of 19-22% in one years' time (based on SSA 2009b and LFS 2009 data put at the disposal of AIAS by Statistics South Africa). Thus, there is overwhelming evidence that in South Africa informal employment is not a way of alleviating poverty.

*Table 3 Employment\*) by sector, industry and gender, South Africa, 2007, x 1,000 headcount (aged 15-64, Sept.)*

	males			females		
	formal	informal	total	formal	informal	total
Agriculture, fishing etc.	384	114	498	272	196	272
Mining	298	1	299	23	1	24
Manufacturing	1,190	114	1,304	507	130	637
Electricity, gas, water supply	56	5	61	23	0	24
Construction	600	358	959	97	38	135
Wholesale and retail trade	1,210	452	1,663	1,091	656	1,747
Transport, storage, communication	454	123	577	140	17	157
Finance, insurance, other business	788	55	842	574	31	605
Community, social, personal serv.	973	89	1,062	1,330	148	1,478
Private households**)	0	323	323	0	943	943
Total	5,954	1,635	7,588	3,980	2,040	6,020

Source: Statistics South Africa 2009a

\*) employers, employees and self-employed

\*\*\*) counted as a separate category by Statistics South Africa, largely covering domestic workers, here included under 'informal'

Table 3 shows employment in 2007 by industry, gender and sector, divided in formal and informal labour, based on the Statistics South Africa revised time series. Following these official figures, in September 2007 1.6 million men, 21.5% of all males employed, and just over 2 million women, 34% of all, were employed in informal labour. Besides in private households (100%), informal employment was widespread in agriculture and fishing (40%), construction (36%), and wholesale and retail trade (32%). Jointly the wholesale and retail trades and private households accounted for nearly two-thirds (2.3 million of 3.6 million) of

all in informal employment.<sup>6</sup> In 2007, less than 10% of the respective Coloured, Indian/Asian and White people of working age were employed in the informal sector, against 38% of the African labour force (derived from SSA 2009a).

It cannot be emphasized enough that the (statistical) division between formal and informal employment used in this report to provide insights in the South African labour market is rather artificial. Over the last two decades, in many industries the boundaries between formal and informal are blurred in terms of workers' wage and job (in)security. A substantial part of formal sector work is growingly non-standard or 'non-core' i.e. is subject to processes of casualisation (full-time jobs being replaced by low-pay casual jobs), externalisation and/or informalisation, to subcontractors or various forms of labour intermediaries like labour brokers,<sup>7</sup> aiming at saving on labour costs. Well-known examples are from manufacturing, like from the automotive industry, but less widely known are many cases from as various industries as mining and wholesale and retail (Theron 2005; Bodibe 2006). The number of formal-sector workers employed in the standard employment relationship under more or less stable conditions, like clear and written contracts and transparent wages, is eroding gradually. It has been estimated for 2003 that by then about 6.1 million workers belonged to such a 'core' (Von Holdt and Webster 2005, 2008). If we take into consideration that according to the 2005 Labour Force Survey 30% of all workers in the formal sector did not have a written contract, 14% had a temporary contract, and over 8% was in casual labour (SSA 2005b), an estimate of the number of core workers for 2007 may end up with only about 5.2 million, or 38% of the labour force at large. This outcome is just a rough indication: in South Africa the linkages, including labour flows, between the formal and informal economy are manifold, shifting and difficult to grasp.

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6 In 2008, Statistics South Africa re-defined informal employment as to consist of those in the informal sector, plus employees in the formal sector and persons working in private households who do not have a written contract of employment, and whose employers do not contribute to a medical aid plan or a pension on their behalf. Defined this way, in April-June 2008 56% of all South African women employed were in formal employment, 41% in informal employment and 3% in other employment (which refers to employers and own-account workers who are not in the informal sector). Again, men were more to be found in the formal sector: their shares were 62%, 32% and 6% respectively (SSA 2008a).

7 A labour broker is the Southern African equivalent of a temporary or private employment agency. Following flexibility provisions in recent South African labour law (LRA and BCEA), the broker remains the employer of the procured worker: there is no employment relationship with the client-employer. Legally there is no time limit to which a worker placed with a client is deemed to remain temporary. Unless legal provisions, many brokers do not register. The combination of these elements obviously leads to the serious undermining of workers' rights, not least of the rights to join a union and to engage in collective bargaining. A trade union video accounts to where this can lead: "Most of the workers were initially employed by [newspaper company], but when the company outsourced its services to the labour broker, their wages dropped, their security of employment disappeared and benefits like provident fund and medical aid vanished. Critically in this new employment relationship, opportunities for exploitation and harassment have grown tenfold. A number of women workers recount how male supervisors demand and receive sexual favours in order to secure some women places in the daily or weekly shifts" (Ndungu 2009, 3)

### 2.3.3. Unemployment

Since the 1980s the counting of unemployment is a hot issue in South Africa. In 1998, Statistics South Africa declared a narrow definition of unemployment (excluding the unemployed who wanted work but did not search actively in a 4-week reference period) the official one, opposite to a broad measure (including this group). In 1999 this made a difference between 23 and 36% unemployed. Researchers have argued that under the South African conditions the broad measure of unemployment is a more accurate reflection of (structural) joblessness than the narrow one (ALRN 2004, 18; Kingdon and Knight 2000, 2007). Obviously, voluntary unemployment is rather rare; on average unemployed are substantially worse-off than the informally employed – both in terms of income and in terms of well-being—but many have given up searching for a job (Kingdon and Knight 2007, 828-9).

After democratization, unemployment increased largely. Using the narrow definition, between 1995-2003 it grew from 17 to 28%; using the broad one from 29 to 42%, and for Africans according to the broad yardstick even from 37 to 49%. While at that time urban unemployment among Africans was already quite high, with rates of 41% for men and 53% for women, the rural figures were even higher, with respectively 45% of men and 58% of women unemployed – implying that in both urban and rural areas over half of all African women that were able to work were unemployed (NALEDI 2004). Moreover, the share of long-term unemployed remained large. While in 1994 long-term unemployment (of more than one year) accounted for 67% of the unemployed, in 2000 this proportion had even grown to 71%. By that time, three of five of the 5.25 million unemployed –three million people!-- claimed never to have worked before. Even three of four jobless between the ages of 15 and 30 had never worked (Brookes and Hinks 2004; ALRN 2004, 19). In the course of the 2000s the share of long-term unemployed in total unemployment fell to 58% in 2007, to climb most recently again to 60% in April-June 2009 (SSA 2008a, 2009b).

Unemployment is especially high among African women and youngsters. In April – June 2008, the unemployment of African women (according to the narrow definition) stood at 31.1%, against 23.4% for African men. Among the various population groups, the picture continued which showed unemployment rates for women being consistently higher than those for men: coloured women 21.3% against 17.9% for coloured men; Indian/Asian women 15.7% against 10.8%, and white women 5.8% against 3.6% for white men. Thus, in the second quarter of 2008, the unemployment rate among African women was more than eight times that of white men (SSA 2008b). Youth unemployment remains at a disquieting high level too. In April – June 2009, 679,000 young women aged 15-24 were registered as unemployed, against 620,000

employed, implying the extremely high unemployment rate (narrow definition!) of 52%. For the young men aged 15-24 the respective figures were 703,000 unemployed against 869,000 employed, bringing their unemployment rate to nearly 45%.<sup>8</sup> In the second quarter of 2009, the inactivity rates of the 15-24-years old were 71.8% -- 74.1% for girls and young women, and 68.8% for boys and young men. By detracting a maximum of 57% students (that is, all students imputed to this age group), it follows that at least 15% of all youngsters outside the employed and the officially unemployed had no clear productive activity or means of existence. Moreover, it is a bad sign that, of those 15-24 of age employed, in April – June 2009 the large proportion of 38% (36% of the young women and 40% of the young men employed) was employed informally. A year earlier this proportion was even 42% (authors' calculations, based on SSA 2009b and LFS 2009 data put at the disposal of AIAS by Statistics South Africa).

All these figures are proof for the poor employment record of the GEAR program. The public works programmes (PWPs) did not provide sustainable employment, and participation merely temporarily reduced the depth of poverty. The enactment of the National Skills Act (1998) and the creation of sectoral training authorities (SETAs) in 1999 does not seem to have given a boost to companies' training activities. Moreover, large numbers of workers are unable to pay training costs by themselves. The bottomline continues to be the slow growth rate of the economy. This slowness is combined with a system of strict labour regulation that does not seem quite appropriate to tackle the South African conditions of huge unemployment and sharp labour market segmentation (Kingdon and Knight 2007, 836-43; Orr 2003, 31).

A closer look at the 2008 unemployment statistics learns that 40% of all unemployed, and even 45% of the unemployed women, were new entrants to the labour market. No less than 1.6 million (53%) of the 3.0 million unemployed aged 15-34 years were new entrants. Across educational categories, this proportion hardly differed (SSA 2008a). Once more these figures underline the inability of the South African economy to absorb young entrants. Dias (2006) has convincingly linked these problems with developments in education and employer behaviour. She argues that by 2003 there was hardly any gap in education between the employed and the unemployed searching jobs of 16-25 years of age. It seemed paradoxical: the younger cohorts in the labour market had gained more schooling than older cohorts, but had higher rates of unemployment. In the early 2000s the completion of secondary schooling (having a matric qualification) did not enhance the probability of finding work. At the same time the level of this qualification was questioned – and still is. A growing number of matriculants chose –and choose-- for standard grade matric qualifications that required less

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8 In April-June 2009, unemployment rates for the next higher age group, the 25-34 of age, were 31% (women) and 24% (men) (authors' calculations, based on SSA 2009b and LFS 2009 data put at the disposal of AIAS by Statistics South Africa).

demonstration of the analytical skills of the candidate. First, in the perception of employers, this might have rendered the matric less useful as a screening device in judging the future productivity of a worker. Second, matriculants were less likely to have previous work experience and this might provide another explanation for their unemployment. Dias suggests that, to the extent that a lack of experience creates a barrier to employment for individuals with formal qualifications, the learnership programmes developed by the Department of Labour may provide a means of breaking a vicious cycle. These learnerships provide firms with tax incentives to hire and train unemployed individuals whilst on fixed term employment contracts (Dias 2006, 29).

## 2.4. National legislation and labour relations

### 2.4.1. Legislation

South Africa has ratified all eight core ILO Labour Conventions 29, 87, 98, 100, 105, 111, 138 and 182 (ITUC information). Its labour legislation is highly codified and complicated. After the first democratic elections, the significant rewriting of labour laws resulted in four key pieces of legislation: the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1995 (amended in 2002); the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) of 1997 (also amended in 2002), the Employment Equity Act (EEA) of 1998 (amended in 2006), and the Skills Development Act (SDA) of 1999. The new 1996 Constitution of South Africa provides for the right to join trade unions, and to unions to collectively bargain and strike. However, the current LRA limits the right to strike; workers engaged in 'essential services' (e.g. electricity workers and doctors) have no right to strike while other so called 'ordinary workers' may not engage in strikes in support of secondary issues unless they go through an elaborate court process (Orr 2003, 39; NALEDI 2008, 46).

The 1996 Constitution explicitly seeks to eliminate unfair discrimination (sections 9(1) and 9(2)). The new labour legislation sets a framework for the removal of unfair discrimination in employment and Human Resource practices, by the promulgation of the unfair labour practice provisions in Schedule 7 of the LRA, the prohibition against unfair discrimination in the EEA, and similar provisions in the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (1999). Generally, an employer is required to prove that discrimination is not unfair. The EEA does not set quotas, but rather enables individual employers to develop their own plans, especially concerning recruitment and selection and remuneration (Horwitz *et al* 2002).

The BCEA and its amendments establish, enforce and regulate the basic conditions of employment; it sets the minimum floor of rights for all those working at least 24 hours a month with a single employer. Among other things, the BCEA entitles workers to:

- (employment contract): a written particulars of employment (contract), including among others, the names of the employer and employee, place of work, wage and rate of payment, and the date of termination of employment if applicable (section 28)
- (paid annual leave): the employer is required to grant an employee full annual leave of 21 consecutive days on full pay for every year of work. Otherwise the leave is calculated on a pro-rata basis of either one day of annual leave for every 17 days of work, or one hour of annual leave for every 17 hours of work (section 21)
- (paid sick leave): sick leave is calculated in a cycle of 36 months (three years) and is approximately 30 days. However, in the first six of employment, the employee is entitled to approximately 7 days of sick leave (section 22)
- (maternity leave): pregnant workers are entitled to at least four consecutive months of maternity leave. An employee must not work for six weeks after delivery, unless a doctor or midwife certifies that she is fit to do so (section 25)
- (paid family responsibility leave): family responsibility leave only applies to an employee who has been working for an employer for more than four months, or works for at least four days a week. Paid family responsibility leave is granted for at least three days during each year of employment, and reasons may include the following: when the employee's child is born; when the employee's child is sick; in the event of the death of the employee's spouse, life partner, parent, adoptive parent, grand-parent, child, adopted child, or sibling (section 27)
- (maximum working hours) if the maximum number of days worked per week is five, the maximum ordinary hours per day is nine; if the maximum number of days worked per week is more than five, the maximum ordinary hours per day is eight; in both cases, the maximum ordinary hours per week is 45 (section 9)

According to the union movement, the coming into being of the BCEA has not always implied progress, like in the case of maternity benefits.<sup>9</sup> While setting a minimum of four months maternity leave, the law imposed this on the Unemployment Insurance Fund that had until then allowed women six months paid benefits

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<sup>9</sup> Maternity benefit is equal to 45% of the insured's weekly earnings and is paid for a total of 17 weeks (6 weeks in the event of a miscarriage or a stillborn child). The benefit is payable from 18 weeks before and up to 8 weeks after the expected date of childbirth.

(Orr 2003, 40). More generally, employers' compliance with labour legislation is worrisome. We already pointed out that in 2005 30% of all workers in the formal sector did not have a written contract. Moreover, 39% of them reported having no paid leave; this was not only the case for 78% of domestic workers, but also for 40% of those working in wholesale and retail, 21% of those working in finance etc., and even 20% of those working in community, social and personal services (SSA 2005b). Specifically concerning maternity leave, unions have argued for many years that vulnerable workers struggle to effect this right in practice (Orr 2003, 40).

As for social security, currently pension and related fund contributions are not mandatory, but all employers must make contributions on behalf of their employees to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF). By September 2005, almost half of all workers (46%) reported having no deduction of UIF contributions, while 69% said they did not have medical aid benefits covered. In wholesale and retail trade, the latter proportion was even 85%, but even in finance and other business services it was 64%. We already noted that 39% of all workers surveyed reported having no paid leave (SSA 2005b). It also should be taken into account that, because of their qualifying conditions, social insurance benefits are tied up to the formal economy, limiting the number of beneficiaries seriously.<sup>10</sup>

#### **2.4.2. Labour relations**

Based on the LRA, South Africa has developed a two-tiered collective bargaining structure that includes single unions voluntarily bargaining at company and plant level, and Bargaining Councils (before 1995 Industrial Councils) that consist of registered trade unions and employers' associations within a particular industry, occupation or area. They deal with collective agreements, attempt to solve labour disputes, and bring forward proposals on labour policies. They may also administer pension funds, sick pay, and unemployment and training schemes. According to LRA section 32, a Bargaining Council can request the Minister of Labour to extend a collective agreement to non-parties which fall within its jurisdiction. Moreover, the Amended LRA prescribes that the Councils are to extend their services and functions to workers in the informal sector and to home-workers. The BCEA and its amendments establish, enforce and regulate the basic conditions of employment; it sets the minimum floor of rights for employees in the South African labour market. At top level, NEDLAC, the country's tripartite social partnership, has been constituted. It monitors labour, economic and social development policies. Further relevant bodies include the Council for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), and the Labour Courts (Casale and Posel 2008; Borat *et*

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10 Sickness and maternity benefits are paid to eligible insured workers working more than 24 hours a month, the unemployed, or workers with earnings reduced to no more than one-thirds of the regular wage. For these benefits, the insured must have at least 13 weeks of contributions in the 52 weeks before the incapacity began respectively before the expected date of child-birth.

al/2009a). The primary function of the CCMA is to conciliate and arbitrate disputes. It is widely being claimed to have made workplace justice more accessible and less costly for common workers. The number of cases processed by the CCMA increased rapidly, to nearly 130,000 in 2005/'06. About 70% of all cases regarded unfair dismissal (Bhorat *et al* 2009b).

Following processes of merging of old as well as the creation of new unions, actually three trade union (con)federations are in existence: COSATU, SACOTU (FEDUSA and NACTU), and CONSAWU. All three (respectively four) are ITUC affiliates. We will now go into their characteristics.

The oldest and largest union confederation, COSATU, was formed in 1985. COSATU has 21 affiliated unions, by November 2008 jointly organizing 1.8 million members (ITUC information). From the very beginning the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) has been a major force in COSATU; created in 1982, the NUM was deeply involved in the anti-apartheid struggle. In 1990 the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), formed in 1954 and subsequently growing into the (underground) trade union arm of the ANC, dissolved and advised its membership to join the COSATU unions. Like through organising strikes, COSATU contributed substantially to the end of the apartheid regime. COSATU's strongholds continue to be in the export-oriented manufacturing and mining industries. A 2004 survey among COSATU members in these industries revealed a high level of participation in union affairs and effective shopfloor organisation (Wood and Glaister 2008). COSATU boasts the affiliation of the country's four single largest unions: the NUM, with currently over 270,000 members; SADTU, the teachers' union (224,000); NUMSA, the metalworkers' union (216,000), and NEHAWU, the health and education workers' union (200,000) (Global Union Directory). COSATU membership shows a shift towards higher-skilled workers and the public sector. Actually, about one-third of its members are in the public sector and nearly one-quarter are degreed professionals (Paton and Naidoo 2009).

COSATU is in alliance with the ANC and the SACP. Though this political alignment is a recurrent subject of debate within COSATU, it prevents the prospect of forming a single-union confederation: FEDUSA and NACTU have dispelled any possibility of merging with a confederation that is politically aligned. In the past the COSATU leadership has been at odds with the government on various occasions, like on the need to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Already in 1998, the COSATU congress passed a resolution to campaign for treatment and greater public access to antiretroviral drugs (wikipedia; see also section 2.6.2). Recurrent issues for debate were and are also economic government strategies. In the mid-2009 strike movement, again, COSATU took a stand rather independent of government policies. COSATU back in 1986

launched a Living Wage Campaign; from 1999 on this campaign has been included in the confederation's broader Jobs and Poverty Campaign. In 2007, COSATU's General Secretary expressed the need of the Living Wage Campaign to be expanded to the sectors regarded vulnerable, including the retail, security and cleaning sector (Zwelinzima Vavi in Ndungu 2007, 16). COSATU has a strong women wing. The 2009 COSATU National Gender Conference resolved concerning collective bargaining, among other issues: unions to push for the implementation of employment equity legislation, prioritizing the employment of women in traditionally male occupations; eliminating barriers to women's employment including parental rights, childcare and other facilities; develop conscious and focused strategies to organize young women workers; campaigns and collective bargaining on issues that affect women such as gender-biased violence, sexual harassment, reproductive health and HIV/AIDS. The Conference urged the federation to continue to build strong civil society linkages with women's movements locally, nationally and internationally (Google website COSATU news).

After long deliberations and a full year behind schedule, in November 2007 the South African Confederation of Trade Unions (SACOTU) was launched, as the result of the policy –not administrative-- merger of the NACTU and FEDUSA confederations. Its policy integration conference decided that its first president would be the former female FEDUSA president, Mary Maletle. In June 2009, the new confederation claimed 890,000 organized (SACOTU website), but in November 2008 ITUC set membership on 360,000 for FEDUSA and 310,000 for NACTU (in the international field obviously still operating separately). From the outset labour relations watchers perceived the merger as the swallowing up of NACTU, smaller (by the time 300,000 members) but having historically more in common with COSATU, by the larger, more moderate and 'whiter' FEDUSA. At the same time it is recognized that the current SACOTU membership is overwhelmingly black (Mde 2006). The largest SACOTU affiliates are PSASA, the public servants' association (180,000); UASA, the United Association (85,000); IMATU, organizing mainly municipal workers (73,000), and HOSPERSA, the health and other services union (50,000)(Global Union Directory). SACOTU's basic policy documents emphasize gender equality as well as decent work and decent life objectives (SACOTU 2007).

Another confederation, CONSAWU (Confederation of South African Workers' Unions), spawned in 2003, uniting 21 smaller, earlier independent, unions and rooted in the christian tradition in unionism. By November 2008, membership was set at 290,000 (ITUC information). Solidarity, with about 130,000 members, was the driving force behind the creation of CONSAWU and remains its largest affiliate. In an earlier

stage the NACTU and FEDUSA merger talks included CONSAWU, but this confederation was excluded because of the alleged right-wing alignment of a CONSAWU affiliate (SACOTU 2007, 4). Initially, the new confederation claimed to have 400,000 members, and applied to be admitted to the NEDLAC, the tripartite social partnership. NEDLAC, requiring a 300,000-member threshold for admission, rejected the new confederation. Subsequently, CONSAWU took NEDLAC and the three other union confederations to the Labour Appeal Court, as to challenge the ‘unfair’ rejection. Recently the final refusal of recognition is linked in CONSAWU pamphlets to a cry for decent work and freedom of association: “We have witnessed in the Republic of South Africa derogations from these standards and fundamental rights” (CONSAWU website).

After the ban on Black unions was lifted, between 1985 and 1995 union membership grew rapidly, as did wages in unionized companies and industries. In the mid-1990s, African unionised workers received a wage about 20% higher than that received by non-unionised African colleagues with the same characteristics; besides, non-unionised workers that were covered by an Industrial (now Bargaining) Council agreement enjoyed a 7 – 10% wage premium (Schultz and Mwabu 1998; Butcher and Rouse 2001; Bhorat *et al*/2009a). Ten years later, in 2005, workers being part of both a union and a Bargaining Council enjoyed a wage premium of over 15%. This result was primarily driven by the fact that almost 95% of workers in the public sector were now covered by Bargaining Councils, among which many organized workers. The years 1995-2000 witnessed a strong decrease in union density, from 38% (2,006,000) of all Africans aged 16 and older in wage employment to 32% (1,886,000). Nevertheless, the research results show that union membership continues to have a strong effect on determining wages in South Africa – though recently Bargaining Council coverage also proved to be critical. Moreover, both union and Bargaining Council coverage served to reduce wage inequality (Bhorat *et al*/2009a, 52, 63; see also section 2.5.1).

From 2000 on, the number of African union members grew to 2,110,000 in 2006, but employment of Blacks expanded much stronger. The initial decrease in union density after democratisation was especially large among African women (10%points, from 36 to 26% in 2000), and more moderate among African men (from 39 to 36%). Then, the decrease of union density to an overall 30.5% in 2006 was to be attributed to a falling male density, of 33.4% in 2006, with female density remaining constant. Recently the female density rate remained 6 to 7%points behind the male rate. The density rates for Coloured, Indian/Asian and White employees are most likely 7-11% points lower than those of African employed (wikipedia). Organized women are relatively high educated, and this notably holds for Black women. Earlier, in 2003, nearly half of all unionised African women were teachers and nurses (Casale and Posel 2008 – compare with a 13% share

of these two occupational groups in the female workforce). Though notably COSATU unions have made efforts to organize women in low-skilled, often informal jobs, like in clothing production, in retail (notably at Shoprite's and Woolworth's -- Von Holdt and Webster 2008; ITUC 2009a) and in security and contract cleaning (NALEDI 2008), it is unlikely that this picture has basically changed since.

Table 11 provides a detailed overview of trade unions in South Africa. The most relevant unions for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE target group may be:

- affiliated to COSATU: South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (SACCAWU), and The Finance Union (SASBO);
- affiliated to SACOTU (FEDUSA and NACTU): Banking, Insurance, Finance and Assurance Workers Union (BIFAWU); Care Centre, Catering, Retail & Allied Workers' Union (CCRAWUSA); Hotel, Liquor, Catering, Commercial and Allied Workers (HOTELLICA); Insurance and Banking Staff Association (IBSA); National Services and Allied Workers Union (NSAWU), and South African Communications Union (SACU);
- affiliated to CONSAWU: Federal Council of Retail and Allied Workers (FEDCRAW); South African Food, Retail and Agricultural Workers' Union (SAFRAWU), and Transport Action, Retail & General Workers' Union (THOR).

Based on the latest membership indications of the three/four confederations and those of independent unions, we conclude to a total union membership in South Africa in 2008 of about 3.2 million; thus, we can estimate total union density to be about 24% of all employed. The female density can be estimated at 20% (sources: Global Union Directory, union websites). Due to differences in employment definitions (the denominator), these figures cannot be straightforwardly compared with earlier ones. Unionization remains largely bound to the formal sector. We estimate for 2008 the union density in the formal sector at 31%, against about 3% in the informal sector. It is unlikely that more than 130,000 informal workers are organized (sources: Global Union Directory, union websites; earlier outcomes in Orr 2003 and SSA 2005b). Recently a researcher of NALEDI, COSATU's research institute, argued that "While an ever increasing number of workers has been casualised, outsourced or informalised, unions have concentrated on the shrinking pool of core-workers for survival" (Ndungu 2009, 8).

As for sectors, the 2005 Labour Force Survey found the highest union density (79%, 1995: 71%) in the mining and quarrying sector. Well organised were also the community, social and personal services (57%, 1995: 41%); utilities (56%, 1995: 41%), and manufacturing (though showing a large decrease: 38%, against

46% in 1995). Lower, though by international comparison not that low, were density rates in finance etc. (24%, 1995: 21%) and in wholesale and retail trade (24%, as well as 24% in 1995). The lowest and second lowest were the rates among domestic workers (3%, 1995: 1%) and agriculture and forestry workers (10%, 1995: 7%) respectively. With 11% (1995: 19%), the level of organization was remarkably low in the construction sector (2005: SSA 2005b; 1995: Orr 2003). The above figures show over the period 1995-2005 that, while density rates fell in manufacturing and construction, union strength increased in the public sector, utilities, and finance etc. Within the formal sector, unionization concentrates in larger workplaces. While in the mid-2000s unionized enterprises accounted for about 40% of all formal enterprises, roughly 75% of workers in enterprises employing 150 people or more were unionized. In larger workplaces the major unions have a representation through elected shop stewards. These unionized enterprises include those in highly-export-oriented industries, as organized by NUMSA and NUM. Research shows that workers in these industries are no less militant than their domestically oriented counterparts (Wood and Glaister 2008).

Among the organizations representing employers are the South African Chamber of Business and its regional affiliates; Business Unity South Africa, which was formed by the 2003 merger of the Black Business Council and Business SA, and many regional, local and sector-specific employer bodies (Ryan 2007).

## 2.5. Wage-setting and minimum wage

### 2.5.1. The minimum wage

Wages can be set in South Africa basically in three ways: in the statutory system of wage determination through the Bargaining Councils and through sectoral determinations made by the Minister of Labour, and—outside that system—in centralised bargaining fora as well as decentralised at company (single-employer) and plant level. There is no national (statutory) minimum wage, but the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) permits the Minister of Labour to set minimum terms and conditions of employment, including minimum wages. Thus, ministerial sectoral determinations are in place in areas of economic activity where labour has been deemed vulnerable by the Department of Labour (DOL), based on a process of research and consultation between the relevant employers and employees in the sector and DOL. The Minister is not allowed to publish a sectoral determination covering employees and employers who are already covered by a collective agreement concluded at a Bargaining Council. Actually, sectoral determinations are in place for nine areas (website SA Dept of Labour / page payslips):

- domestic workers
- contract cleaning
- private security sector
- wholesale and retail
- farm worker sector
- forestry sector
- taxi sector
- learnerships
- children in the performance of advertising, artistic and cultural activities

The minimum wage amounts included vary widely, according to location, function, years of experience, and working hours. After quite some investigation, we found out that there are currently about 1,800 different minimum wage rates, based on the sectoral determinations alone. Upratings are mostly calculated three to four years in advance, and are normally fixed for one year. For example, from 01/02/2009 to 31/01/2010 in wholesale and retail the lowest minimum wage rates (for a General Assistant) are set in Area A at R 1,947 per month respectively in Area B at R 1,676 per month, and the highest rates (for a Manager) are R 4,697 per month in Area A and R 3,754 per month in Area B. We calculated the rates of these minimum wages determined by DOL to be between 19 to 72% of the 2008 average monthly wages (excluding bonuses and overtime) in the respective sectors, excluding domestic and farm workers (based on SSA 2009c). Overall, the lowest minimum wages are set at 125% of the upper-bound national poverty line (in 2008 prices). It has to be noted that the minimum wages determined by DOL are far from easy to be traced. Some rates seem outdated, or at least publication in the *Government Gazette* is lagging behind decision-making on uprating. These practices add considerably to the fact that, as local experts emphasize, non-compliance with minimum wages is generally a large problem. Moreover, DOL has hardly any control capacity; in the last decade its staff of labour inspectors has been nearly halved (Ndugu 2007).

Based on 2007 employment figures the sectors with minimum wage determinations jointly covered about 5.5 million workers: 40% of the South African workforce, of which about 3,050,000 women, 50.5% of the female workforce. In the determinations for some sectors, higher minimum wages are specified for those with lower working hours. In domestic services, for example, employees who work less than 28 hours a week are entitled to an hourly wage which is about 10% higher than that earned by employees working longer hours. In wholesale and retail, the minimum hourly wage for individuals working fewer than 28 hours

a week can be even 25% higher than the hourly wage specified in the sectoral determination for their occupation. A possible motivation for these higher hourly wages may be to offset the lower level of benefits received by those working fewer hours per week (Posel and Muller 2008, 472).

In collective agreements at industry level via the agency of Bargaining Councils minimum wage floors are set too. Within industries, such minimum wages may also vary by location and often by occupation. As mentioned, the Minister of Labour may declare these minimum wages extended to employers in the industry and area, who were not parties to the negotiations. While in 2005 32% of formally employed workers was covered by Bargaining Councils, only 4.6% was covered by extensions. In 1995, still only 15% of workers were covered by the (then) Industrial Committees. In between, the system expanded in the public sector. The formalisation of teachers, nurses and other public sector professionals into the Public Sector Co-ordinating Bargaining Council has had a positive effect on the earnings of females (Bhorat *et al* 2009a, 33-6). If our calculations are correct, in 2007 77% of the South African labour force, including 85% of the female labour force, might formally have been covered by regulations laying down minimum wages.

For some categories of South African workers laying down minimum wages has had substantial positive effects. Between 2001-2005, the monthly median wages of the elementary occupations increased by 65%, against an (unweighted) average increase for all nine occupational groups of 18%. This coincided with the extension of minimum wage legislation to industries not previously covered (Hlekiso and Mahlo 2006, 9, 16). In September 2002, roughly one million domestic workers – about 840,000 predominantly African and Coloured women who are working as housekeepers, cooks and nannies, and another 180,000 men who work primarily as gardeners-- were granted formal labour market protection, and two months later a schedule of minimum wages went into effect. These regulations do appear to have raised wages. Average nominal hourly wages for domestic workers in September of 2003 were 23% higher than they had been in September 2002, while for similar workers in other occupations the nominal increase was less than 5%. There was some decrease in employment, but that was not clearly related to the wage increase. Despite substantial non-compliance, for many low-paid women the minimum wage made a difference (Hertz 2004).

### 2.5.2. Poverty

South Africa's social indicators perform relatively poor for a country with a GDP per capita in the upper-middle income ranks. For 2000-06, UNDP (2008a) estimated that 42.9 % of the South African population lived under the poverty line mostly used by the United Nations, that is below USD 2 a day (in PPP terms, that was R174 in 2000 prices), and that 26.2% had to make ends meet with an income below the other

international poverty line, USD 1 (PPP) a day. If the extreme poverty yardstick of USD 1 is applied, South Africa is doing better than the other sub-Saharan countries (compare: Angola 54%, Zambia 64%, Malawi 74%, Mozambique 75%) (*MDG Indicator 1.1*, derived from UN MDG Indicators).<sup>11</sup> Yet, all available figures still point at widespread poverty in the country.

Taking into account the (relatively high) South African consumer price levels, poverty is even more widespread than the use of the USD 2 and USD 1 yardsticks might indicate. Through a 'cost-of-basic-needs' approach, normative poverty lines for South Africa have been calculated on 322 Rand (lower-bound) and 593 Rand (upper-bound) per capita per month in 2000 prices.<sup>12</sup> Using the lower-bound poverty line of R322, the researchers in question found for 1995 and 2000 that at least 58% of all South African households, and more than two-thirds of the African population, were poor in either year. Yet, they also found between 1995 and 2000 an increase of the incidence of extreme poverty, with 2.3 million more living on less than USD 2 a day.<sup>13</sup> Over this period, Coloureds made significant gains against poverty, but inequality grew because of a sharp increase in poverty among the Black population. The greatest increases in poverty took place in those provinces encompassing the most populous former homelands as well as in Gauteng, in 1995 the least poor province (Hoogeveen and Özler 2005, 8-10, 22).

Obviously the poorest did not gain much –if anything at all-- from economic growth in the first six years after democratization. In 2000, the poorest 10% of the population had a share of 1,4% in national consumption, and the poorest 20% had a share of 3.5%, the latter being slightly less than in 1995 (*MDG Indicator 1.3*, derived from UN MDG Indicators and UNDP 2008b).<sup>14</sup> Focusing on individual (instead of household) incomes, in 1995-2000 for both genders a massive real income decline has been found of about 40%. At the same time women systematically entered and men systematically left the labour market. For Black women, downward income pressure as they were forced to work in low-income generating informal labour is the most likely explanation. They growingly entered into competition with Black male workers for low-skilled jobs, and thus –jointly with the rapid decline of mining and related manufacturing employ- ment-- put pressure on male earnings (Leibbrandt *et al* 2005, 4, 34; Casale and Posel 2002; Casale *et al* 2004).

11 Statistics South Africa (SSA 2005a) presented lower figures: 34.4% living below USD 2 a day, 11.3% living below USD 1 a day. UNDP (2003) suggested that in 2002 4.7 million South Africans, or 11.0% of the population, lived below USD 1 a day. For reasons of international comparability, we use here and in our other country reports primarily the UN MDG Indicator outcomes concerning the incidence of poverty.

12 The upper-bound poverty line includes an additional R271 for non-essential non-food items.

13 Confirmed by Statistics South Africa, which noted an increase of the population share under USD 1 a day of 7.6% in 1995 to 11.3% in 2000 (And of the share under USD 2 a day of 30.9% in 1995 to 34.4% in 2000 -- SSA 2005a). Other authors, starting from a poverty line of about USD 3 a day, found that the share of the poor stabilized or fell slightly over 1995-2000, though the number of poor increased with maximum 1.1 million because of population growth (Van der Berg and Louw 2004, 567).

14 Statistics South Africa (2005a) presented for 2000 a lower figure (2.8%).

Mobility out of poverty seems to have been considerable, but mobility into poverty as well, and obviously in the 1990s both movements were of the same magnitude. Research in KwaZulu-Natal suggested that about one-third that were poor in 1993, found themselves above the (about USD 2 a day) poverty line five years later. If this outcome might be generalized, about two-thirds of the poor can be called chronically poor. The largest groups of chronically poor households and individuals are: rural poor (in 2000 about 1 million households); female-headed households (see below); elderly; ex-farm workers; migrants; street homeless, and AIDS orphans (Aliber 2003).

According to the Income and Expenditure Survey of households 2005/06 (IES2005), by then the consumption levels of 33% of all households and 47% of all individuals were below the lower-bound poverty line. In 2005, the share of poorest 20% of the population in the national consumption was 4.1%. Though because of changing definitions comparison with the statistics of 1995 and 2000 is difficult, these figures seemed to point at a decrease of poverty between 2000 and 2005-06.<sup>15</sup> Along race lines, the share below the lower-bound line was by far highest among Blacks (55%), followed by Coloureds (34%) and Indians (7%), while only a very small share of whites (0.4%) fell below this line. Along this yardstick over 93% of all poor individuals was black. Again, the incidence of poverty was by far highest in the rural areas, mostly the overcrowded former homelands, with poverty rates more than double those for urban areas. Hence, nearly 60% of all poor households and individuals were rural dwellers, despite the fact that urbanisation is well advanced in South Africa, with in 2005 only 35% of all households (and 41% of the population) living in rural areas (Armstrong *et al* 2008; Aliber 2003).

Using data from a (semi-)annually market research survey provides evidence that both average and median real incomes from 2002 on increased substantially. Blacks and Coloureds were the primary beneficiaries of the rapid and massive expansion of the South African social safety net. Between 2000-01 and 2004-05, social grant payments doubled, rising by some R22 billion in real terms (while the total income of the poor in 2000 was R27 billion). The bulk of the additional grant spending came in the form of assistance for households with children, with the age limit for eligibility for the child support grant gradually being raised from seven to 14 years. The number of beneficiaries of the disability grant nearly doubled, while foster care grant and care dependency grant beneficiaries also increased strongly. If nothing else was different, the incidence of poverty among households would have been 10.7%points higher in 2005 had the various types of social grants not existed. Improvements in job prospects for Blacks between 2004-'07 played an additional role in increasing real average earnings for this group. Since the turn of the century the incidence of poverty

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15 According to IES2005, in 2005-06 53% of households and 68% of individuals consumed less than the upper-bound line.

has shown a marked decline. A larger, more multi-racial middle class has emerged (Van der Berg *et al* 2008, 66-70; also: Armstrong *et al* 2008, 21-2).

For 2006, South Africa ranked 125<sup>th</sup> in a total of 179 countries on the human development index (HDI) of the UNDP (expressing life expectancy, education and per capita income), after a disquieting decrease of 0.017%-points during the period 2000-2006. The 2006 ranking was slightly higher than Botswana, but more widely above the rates for other sub-Saharan countries. Also for 2006, the South African ranking on the Gender-adjusted Development Index (GDI) was, with position no. 108 among 157 countries, about the same. Botswana, again, followed on no. 109 closely, while the other sub-Saharan countries remained at wider distance (UNDP 2008a). According to the UNDP ratings, the 2006 HDI rank of South Africa was 49 places below its GDP per capita rank – the world's fifth largest difference between the two social and economic rankings.

Indeed, the exceptionally unequal income distribution in South Africa is a major reason for its comparatively poor social performance. This is so despite the declining incidence of poverty from 2000 onwards. In terms of the Gini coefficient, an income distribution measure that rates 0 as perfect equality and 100 as perfect inequality, inequality estimates for 2004-05 vary between 0.67 and 0.72 (Van der Berg *et al* 2008, 69; Armstrong *et al* 2008, 5)<sup>16</sup>: still making South Africa one of the most unequal countries in the world. In 2005 the poorest 10% of households (17% of the population) accounted for 1.7% of total consumption, meaning some progress compared to the 1.4% of 2000, but still awfully low compared to the 46% share of the richest 10% of households (which comprised less than 6% of the population --Armstrong *et al* 2008, 5-6).

As we already indicated the UN Human Development Report (1996) calculated for 1994 that, if white South Africa was treated as a separate country, its standard of living would have ranked 24<sup>th</sup> in the world, while black South Africa on the same basis would have ranked 123<sup>rd</sup>. In 1994, 55% of households lacked adequate sanitation and 30% clean water supply; 58% had no access to electricity. Progress in this field in the next decade has been obvious. Over 3 million subsidized houses have been built, including 2.7 million houses for the poor (ANC 2009). In 2007, only 7% was in lack of access to a clean (in UN terms improved) drinking water source, fully concentrated in rural areas where 13% lacked such water sources (WHO 2009). According to the IES, in 2005/06 31% of households had no access to piped water, 41% lacked adequate sanitation and 19% had no access to electricity. However, these outcomes also confirm that the burden of poverty --through the lack of access to services--continues to fall heavily on the chronically poor, and among them especially on girls and women. To give just two examples: in 2005-06 three of four of the poor-

16 This is the Gini coefficient without taking social transfers into account. If these are taken into account, the Gini for 2004-05 may fall to about 0.38 (cf. SSA 2005a).

est 20% had no adequate sanitation and 36% no electricity (UNDP 2008a; Armstrong *et al* 2008, 17). In rural areas, only 49% of the population had access to improved sanitation, against 66% in urban areas (WHO 2009). The hours of unpaid labour performed by women increase dramatically in case of limited or lacking access to basic services. As Statistics South Africa surveys reveal, notably collecting water and firewood is a very time-consuming job for women and girls<sup>17</sup>; the continuous need to spend much time in collecting these essentials will impact negatively on the education and social development of girls (cf. Orr 2003, 32).

Clearly, female-headed households are overrepresented among those below the lower-bound poverty line. In 2000, over 750,000 female-headed households were estimated to be chronically poor (Aliber 2003). In 2005-06, their situation does not seem to have been improved. For these years it was reported that 45% of all female-headed households –about 1,3 million-- lived below the lower-bound poverty line, compared to 25% of male-headed households. In 2005-'06 of the poorest 20% of households, 53% were female-headed, against 39% of all households. As regards age, the incidence of poverty generally increased with the age of the head of the household. The only exception was the group of households headed by 15-to-24-year olds, with a poverty rate of already 28%, compared to the overall rate of 33% -- an indication of the consequences of persistent youth unemployment in South Africa. The rate for those aged 25-34 was 24% (Armstrong *et al* 2008, 13-15). With rank 108, for 2006 the South African Gender-adjusted Development Index (GDI) was somewhat higher than its overall HDI ranking (125<sup>th</sup>), but low compared to the neighbouring countries as well (UNDP 2008a). For 2008 the Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum ranked South Africa 22<sup>nd</sup> of 130 countries. For economic participation and opportunity, South Africa only ranked 93<sup>th</sup>, in educational attainment 45<sup>th</sup>, in health and survival 67<sup>th</sup> and concerning political empowerment 9<sup>th</sup> (Hausmann *et al* 2008).

Finally, and without any apologies for criminals, there is extensive evidence of a relationship between widespread poverty, high unemployment and social marginalisation on the one hand and violence and crime on the other. In the first eight years of democratization, crime has risen jointly with unemployment and poverty. For instance, the South African Police (SAPS) website showed that between 1994-'95 and 2002-'03 reported common robbery doubled; “robbery with aggravating circumstances” even more than doubled and reported burglary of residential premises increased by 29%. At the turn of the century, the expression was not exaggerated that murder, rape and other forms of gender-based violence, robbery, hijacking, and burglary were commonplace (cf. website CSVr). It has to be acknowledged that between 2002-'03 and

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17 The Quarterly Labour Force Surveys of 2008 and 2009 report that on average about 3 million persons were regularly involved in “Fetching water or collecting wood/dung” (SSA 2008a, 2009b). Girls and women will make up the large majority of the involved.

2007-'08 the reported incidence of most crime categories decreased, like common robbery by 37%, and robbery with aggravating circumstances by 12%. As said, after 2004 rape cases reported to the police fell by 12% as well. Yet, at the same time drug-related crime nearly doubled. Moreover, in 2007-'08 robbery at business premises and truck hi-jacking increased by nearly 50% (SAPS website, crime data). Thus, it may not come as a surprise if formal sector employers and those operating in the informal sector, including many women, will continue to list crime on top of their constraints for sound business – as they already did in a number of surveys. In the end, high crime rates might produce a vicious circle: they will contribute to less business activities as well as to a brain drain, and thus contribute to poverty and unemployment (cf. Kingdon and Knight 2007).

## 2.6. Demographics and female labour force

### 2.6.1. Population and fertility

For mid-2009, the population of South Africa is estimated at 49,052,000, of which about 24,607,000 females (50.2%) and 24,443,000 males. The average yearly population growth rate for 2005–2008 was 0.9%, but in 2008 this growth rate had fallen to 0.3% (derived from various Statistics South Africa surveys and CIA World Factbook). The estimated 2009 median age is low: 24.4 years – 24.1 for males and 24.8 years for females. The considerable share of 28.9% of the population is 0–14 years, while 65.8% is in the working age group of 15–64-years-olds (CIA World Factbook). All these figures are heavily influenced by the excess mortality due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic: see our next section. Of course, this also holds for the comparatively high death rate, to be estimated at 17.0 per 1,000 population for 2009 (CIA World Factbook). Whereas the South African infant mortality rate (IMR) is much lower than in other sub-Saharan countries and in recent years falling considerably, it certainly is not negligible. Various figures for the IMR circulate, in 2003-'05 ranging from 42.5 to 56 per 1,000 live births (Ryan 2007, 20), but the UN has set the 2005 average at 55 per 1,000 (UNDP 2008b). This average hides huge differences, in 1998 from 62 per 1,000 live births for the poorest 20% of the population to 17 per 1,000 for the richest 20% (UNDP 2008b). Infant mortality is eight to ten times higher for Africans than for whites (Aliber 2003, 475). A second applicable yardstick here is the under-five mortality rate (U5MR). Overall progress is evident: for 2007, the U5MR rate was set for South Africa at 59 per 1,000 live births, against 74 in 2000 and 68 in 2005. The U5MR rate, too, is much lower than the rates of the other sub-Saharan countries. But, again, the within-country differences are huge,

in 1998 ranging from 87 per 1,000 live births among the poorest 20% till 22 per 1,000 for the richest 20% (UNDP 2008a, b).

For 2009, the estimated birth rate in South Africa is 19.9 per 1,000. Its total fertility rate (TFR) is rapidly declining, from 5.5 children per woman in 1970-1975, via 2.8 in 2000-2005 (UNDP 2008b), to an estimated 2.4 children per woman in 2009 (CIA World Factbook): moderately low in worldwide perspective, and falling below the replacement rate that for South Africa can be estimated at 2.6. The TFR varies considerably across population groups: according to the 2001 Census, the rate was 1,7 among Whites, 1.9 among Indians, 2.3 among Coloureds, and 3.0 among Africans (Worku-Yergou Belay 2007). For an indication of the situation of the target group of DECISIONS FOR LIFE, the adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women 15-19 of age) is of special importance. For 2007, the World Health Organization (WHO 2009) set this rate for South Africa at 54 – except for Botswana, the lowest figure among the sub-Saharan countries. In 2001, the adolescent fertility rate for African women stood at 55 per 1,000, for Coloured women at 82 per 1,000. Though lowering among the most recent young cohorts, early motherhood was widespread: still in 2002 43% over the African 15-19-year olds had at least one child (and even 4% of African girls under 15). Teenage motherhood has a strong negative effect on high school completion. By contrast, higher education in particular may result in lower rates of teenage motherhood (Worku-Yergou Belay 2007).

Marriage is not self-evident. According to the 2001 Census, 48% of the African women 20-40 of age with at least one child had never been married. Of those being married, about one third did so through traditional marriage, normally including a lobola (bride price). Polygamy exists, be it to a limited extent, the most prominent example being the country's current president, Jacob Zuma. It has been analysed that better education increases women's chances to be married. However, African women in South Africa would enter into a civil marriage only if the man is employed, reegardless of his income level – mainly because there are fewer eligible African men than women (Worku-Yergou Belay 2007).

Since 1994, life expectancy has fallen by almost 20 years – mainly because of the rise in HIV-related mortality (The Lancet 2009). For 2006, life expectancy at birth in South Africa was with 50.1 years rather low, though still the highest in the sub-Saharan region; the expectancy was 51.0 years for females and 49.1 for males (UNDP 2008a). For 2009, the respective estimates have been lowered to 49.0 years – 48.1 years for males and 49.8 for females (CIA World Factbook). The position of the probability of not surviving to age 40 is about the same; for the cohort born in 2000-05 the South African percentage was 31.7%: in global perspective a high proportion, but the lowest among the sub-Saharan countries (UNDP 2008a). The devel-

opment of these yardsticks in the near future will depend heavily on the spread—or containment—of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Relevant population statistics for South Africa include those concerning race. For 2005, Statistics South Africa estimated the population to be 46,880,200, of which 37,205,700 (79.4%) were Black, 4,148,800 (8.8%) Coloured, 1,153,900 (2.5%) Indian/Asian, and 4,379,800 (9.3%) White (SSA 2005b). Between 1996-2005 the proportion of Whites fell by 1.2%points. This decrease has often been linked to the human capital flight from South Africa in recent years: the brain drain of mainly high-skilled Whites. Not all simple assumptions in the complicated debate on this phenomenon prove to be true. For example, the net loss of high-educated South Africans was as much due to a decrease in immigration as to an increase in emigration, and begun long before democratization. Truth is that the health sector has been particularly hit, with 80,000 health workers emigrating between 1989 and 1997 (wikipedia Economy of South Africa; Butler 2005, 598).

### **2.6.2. HIV/AIDS**

South African demographics are heavily influenced by the high incidence of the HIV and AIDS pandemic. In 2007, about 5.5 million South African people lived with HIV. By then the country's HIV/AIDS prevalence rate for those aged 15-49 was estimated at 16.3% (16,293 per 100,000), the world's fourth highest proportion (WHO 2009), though in 2004 the estimated rate of 18.8% (16.8% - 20.7%) was even higher (UNDP 2008b). In KwaZulu-Natal, HIV prevalence in 2006 had reached a staggering 39% (Bhana and Pattman 2009, 69).

Ambitious government plans as of 1994 and 1997 to combat AIDS turned out to be vulnerable for obstruction by provincial health bureaucracies and lack of professional health workers. Poor relations were developed with the voluntary sector. By the time Mbeki entered into office, in 1999, official estimates of the number of HIV-positive cases stood at four million people. Despite the gravity of the crisis, Mbeki launched broadsides against the conventional intellectual foundations of AIDS health, suggesting that medical scientists and anti-AIDS activists had racial motives. Finally, under pressure of civil organisations, notably the TAC, in July 2002 the Constitutional Court ordered the government to provide nevirapine to all HIV-positive pregnant mothers at all public hospitals free of charge “without delay”; under further court pressure the government in the end responded with an AIDS drugs programme (Meredith 2005, 667-672; Butler 2005). As a group of South African researchers, medical specialists and care providers concludes, “Particularly in the case of HIV/AIDS, denialism and failures in leadership have led to unnecessary loss of life and a runaway epidemic” (The Lancet 2009). The group also points at the major inequalities remaining

in health status and health service access across the country. For example, only 14% of citizens are able to access the private health care sector, and yet they benefit from up to 60% of national health expenditure; moreover, there is a huge mismatch as 79% of all doctors are working in the private sector. The HIV prevalence, the group emphasizes, has contributed significantly to the MDG health targets (MDG 4 and 5) going off track in the late 1990s.

Gender, race and sexuality obviously are key factors underlying HIV risk. New HIV infections disproportionately affect young poor females and in South Africa the young and the poor are predominantly black. In 2008, HIV prevalence among the African population was eight times higher than among Coloureds, and 40 times higher than among Whites and Indians/Asians (derived from HSRC 2009, 79). Intensive migration flows and bad living conditions for a number of occupational groups, like for miners, for mobile workers in commercial agriculture, for truck drivers and for sex workers interacting with such groups, enlarge HIV infection chances for notably Africans (IOM 2007). Trade unions in these sectors, like the COSATU affiliates of mineworkers, communications and transport workers, but also unions of clothing and textile workers, teachers and retail workers are active in pushing employers and Bargaining Councils to engage in prevention, treatment and care concerning HIV/AIDS (NALEDI 2008, 37-44).

Among 15-24-year-olds, women account for about 90% of new HIV infections. And in 2005 HIV incidence among 20-29-year-old women was approximately 5.6%, more than six times higher than for men of the same age (UNAIDS/WHO 2008a, 4). As various reports emphasize, in South Africa young girl's vulnerability to HIV infection in the face of gender power inequalities is compounded by that they increasingly have older partners, not rarely are targeted by older men for sex and in general find very little support and guidance. In daily life a great deal of emphasis is placed on men's dominance over women and girls. Women and girls, in contrast, are widely expected to be passive and innocent on sexual matters (Bhana and Pattman 2009, 69-70; HSRC 2009, 64-5). As UNAIDS/WHO (2008b) argues, girl's subordinated status with regard to boys and men is a critical factor influencing greater risk to infection, placing gender issues at the centre of the HIV prevention challenge. In South Africa developing an understanding of young adults in the context of HIV/AIDS is complicated by that gender is racialized and expressed through social class (O'Sullivan *et al* 2006). Yet, undoubtedly both because of their level of infection and because caring for sick family members is considered a women's task, it is that the burden of HIV/AIDS continues to fall mainly on (black) women. On top of this comes the growing number of orphans. As we argued in our DECISIONS FOR LIFE Country Report No. 1 on Mozambique, orphanage will definitely ruin the prospects in life of many girls. In

2000 the number of chronically poor AIDS orphans in South Africa was estimated at 371,000 (Aliber 2003); this may have reached the one million mark already by 2008.

Research shows the baleful combination between HIV and AIDS and tuberculosis (TB), as one of the main opportunist infections – but largely curable. TB indeed is a major health problem in South Africa. In 2005 the TB prevalence rate was 511 per 100,000 inhabitants, and 58% of the new TB cases were HIV positive. South Africa shows many examples that drug-resistant TB can spread rapidly in communities of people living with HIV, resulting in very high mortality. Moreover, it is spreading among health care workers, of which many women. Multi-drug resistance is becoming an increasing problem. The WHO estimates for 2002 were that 1.8% and 6.7% of new and previously treated TB cases respectively, were multi-drug resistant (UN 2005, 2006; Ryan 2007; UNAIDS/WHO 2008a).

Actually the health authorities are committed to fight the pandemic. They, and the numerous activists in this field, can feel supported by progress in that fight. The latest HIV data collected at antenatal clinics in South Africa suggest that HIV infection levels might be leveling off (UNAIDS/WHO 2008a, 3). The country has reached one of the world's highest levels of HIV testing and HIV status awareness in its general population (UNAIDS/WHO 2008b). Besides the decrease of the estimated overall adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate between 2004 and 2007, as already mentioned, there has most recently been a decrease of HIV prevalence among the 15-24 of age, from 10.3% in 2005 to 8.6% in 2008, and the decrease among those aged 15-19 years seems even larger. This may well be attributable to the considerable increase in condom use observed among males and females aged 14 to 22, that already became visible between 1998 and 2002 (UN 2005; Dinkelman *et al* 2008). In this respect, researchers (HSRC 2009, 66) have called the condom promotion and distribution system developed by the South African government “highly successful”. Moreover, they point at an increased openness in many communities to discuss sex and condom use among youth, linked with the fact that young females are becoming more empowered to negotiate condom use than before. Peer educators in secondary schools play a major role in ‘HIV education’ (De Bruyne 2009). By contrast, HIV prevalence remains disproportionately high for women in the 25-29 year age group, where a nationwide survey in 2008 found one in three (32.7%) to be HIV positive – the same proportion as in 2002 (HSRC 2009, 63-4).

### **2.6.3. Women's labour market share**

A large share of the South African population is 0-14 years: in 2007 31.8%, but with a clear gender difference: 33.8% of the male population and 29.8% of the female part. On the other hand, a rather small

share of the population was 65 of age and older: 5.3% of the total population, only 4.5% of the males and 6.2% of the females (ILO-Laborsta, EAPEP and authors' calculations). If we leave out this last group in order to comply with the internationally comparable Labour Participation Rate (LPR) or Employment-to-Population ratio (EPOP) that only takes stock of the 15-64 of age, we found for 2007 an over-all LPR or EPOP of 57.4%. Across countries, this EPOP is in the middle range. With 49.8%, the female LPR or EPOP is considerably lower than the male figure (64.2%) (*MDG indicator 1.5*). We could estimate the proportion of own-account and contributing family members in total employment (15-65 of age) by 2005 at 19.0% (*MDG indicator 1.7*, derived from UN MDG Indicators).

In table 4 we present more detailed figures, including an overview for 2000-2007. The table shows that according to the official statistics the LPR's for both sexes fell in the 2000s, with respectively 2.7%points and 3.2%points. As the table shows, between 2000-2007 all female shares fell somewhat. In 2007, women made up 44.2% of the employed (2000: 45.1%), but 53.3% (2000: 53.6%) of the unemployed (narrow definition).

*Table 4 Employment status by gender, South Africa, 2000 and 2007 (aged 15-64, Sept.)*

	2000			2007		
	males	females	% fem.	males	females	% fem.
employed*), x 1,000 (a)	6,770	5,566	45.1	7,588	6,020	44.2
unemployed, x 1,000 (b)	1,738	2,004	53.6	1,693	1,931	53.3
not economically active, x 1,000 (c)	4,210	6,720	61.4	5,181	8,001	58.9
labour force, x 1,000 (a+b)	8,508	7,570	47.2	9,281	7,951	46.1
working age, x 1,000 (a+b+c)	12,718	14,290	52.9	14,462	15,592	51.9
unemploy. rate ((b):(a+b) x 100)	20.4%	26.5%		18.2%	24.3%	
absorption rate ((a):(a+b+c) x 100)	53.2%	39.0%		52.5%	37.7%	
LPR/EPOP ((a+b):(a+b+c) x 100)	66.9%	53.0%		64.2%	49.8%	

Source: *Statistics South Africa 2009a*

\*) employers, employees and self-employed

In 2007, women in the (five years<sup>7</sup>) age cohorts between 25 and 50 of age all showed a rather high labour participation (statistics not shown), with rates over 60%, though consistently lower than the male LPR's, which were all over 80% for these age groups. The rates were highest for those aged 35-39, both for women (69.0%) and for men (87.6%). For the 15-19-year-olds, the LPR's remained quite low: 7.7% for girls of that age and 11,5% for boys, while in the 20-24 age cohort about half of all was economically active: 47.1% of the young women of that age, against 56.1% of the young men. With 63.8% for the females and 81.2% for the males, the LPR's for the 25-29-year-olds are considerably higher.<sup>18</sup> Though information on labour mar-

18 It should be noted that in the youngest age category, and below that, child labour may prevail to a certain extent. The 1999 SAYP survey found that, when leaving out fetching fuel and water, about 400,000 children aged 5-17 years or 3% of this age group worked for 12 or more hours per week (SAYP, cited in UN 2005, 19).

ket streams is lacking, these figures are in line with other evidence showing that the South African economy has growing problems to create jobs for newcomers in the labour market. This is especially true for female adolescents (cf. DRPU 2007, 6).

Table 5 (next page) details the figures presented earlier by gender and race. It shows that in 2007 of the 23.5 million Black Africans of working age, 9.6 million were employed and 3.6 million were officially unemployed, resulting in a LPR/EPOP of 56% -- just over 60% for African men and less than 48% for African women. Among women, LPR's were highest for Coloured women (62%), followed by Whites (57%), while with 44% those for Indian/Asian women were by far lowest. The table allows to specify our earlier finding that the LPR's for both sexes fell in the 2000s: this was true for three of four population groups – not for Coloured females and not for White males.

Table 5 Employment status by gender and race, South Africa, 2000 and 2007, x 1,000 headcount (aged 15-64, Sept.)

	2000		2007	
	males	females	males	females
employed*), x 1,000 (a)	(6,770)	(5,566)	(7,588)	(6,020)
Black African	4,630	3,879	5,348	4,271
Coloured	750	625	806	715
Indian / Asian	243	144	298	165
White	1,147	919	1,137	869
unemployed, x 1,000 (b)	(1,738)	(2,004)	(1,693)	(1,931)
Black African	1,447	1,682	1,378	1,647
Coloured	191	210	246	218
Indian / Asian	46	41	27	21
White	54	71	41	45
not economically active, x 1,000 (c)	(4,210)	(6,720)	(5,181)	(8,001)
Black African	3,457	5,296	4,376	6,498
Coloured	285	528	342	574
Indian / Asian	82	187	110	239
White	386	709	353	689
labour force, x 1,000 (a+b)	(8,508)	(7,570)	(9,281)	(7,951)
Black African	6,077	5,561	6,726	5,918
Coloured	941	835	1,052	933
Indian / Asian	289	185	325	186
White	1,201	990	1,178	914
working age, x 1,000 (a+b+c)	(12,718)	(14,290)	(14,462)	(15,592)
Black African	9,534	10,857	11,102	12,415
Coloured	1,226	1,363	1,394	1,508
Indian / Asian	371	371	435	426
White	1,587	1,669	1,532	1,603
narrow unemployment rate ((b):(a+b) x 100)	(20.4%)	(26.5%)	(18.2%)	(24.3%)
Black African	23.8%	30.2%	20.5%	27.8%
Coloured	20.3%	25.1%	23.4%	23.4%
Indian / Asian	15.8%	22.1%	8.4%	11.3%
White	4.5%	7.2%	3.5%	4.9%
absorption rate ((a):(a+b+c) x 100)	(53.2%)	(39.0%)	(52.5%)	(37.7%)
Black African	48.6%	35.7%	48.2%	34.4%
Coloured	61.2%	45.9%	57.8%	47.4%
Indian / Asian	65.5%	38.7%	68.5%	38.8%
White	72.3%	54.1%	74.2%	54.2%
LPR/EPOP ((a+b):(a+b+c)x 100)	(66.9%)	(53.0%)	(64.2%)	(49.8%)
Black African	63.7%	51.2%	60.6%	47.7%
Coloured	76.7%	61.3%	75.5%	61.9%
Indian / Asian	77.8%	49.7%	74.7%	43.8%
White	75.7%	58.3%	76.9%	57.0%

Source: Statistics South Africa 2009a

\*) employers, employees and self-employed

If we calculate absorption rates, dividing the employed (a) by those of working age (a+b+c), the outcomes throw an even clearer light upon the dramatic labour market position of the Africans, particularly of African women. In 2007 only slightly over 34% of African women 15-64 of age were absorbed by the labour market: a fall of 1.3%points compared to their already low absorption rate of 2000. The absorption rates of women from the three other population groups went up slightly, though with 39% the rate of Indian/Asian women remained very low as well. The absorption rates of White males and females were by far highest. Now we can specify our conclusion of the former section: especially Black female adolescents meet large difficulties in finding jobs.

Table 6 shows that between 2000 and 2007, the share of women workers has slightly increased in formal employment, to just over 40%, and decreased in the informal sector, though with 55.5% women still form a clear majority of those in informal employment. In formal labour, the female shares grew in all industries except manufacturing, where the share fell, and community, social and personal services, where the female share remained the same. In informal labour, the picture is mixed, with strong increases of the female part in agriculture, fishing etc. as well as in transport, storage and communication, moderate increases in construction and community and related services as well as decreases in manufacturing, finance and other business and notably in private households, while the female share remained constant in wholesale and retail trade. Taking formal and informal employment together, the strongest growth in female shares took place in agriculture, fishing etc – however, a decreasing sector, as well as in transport etc. and in construction – more meaningful as these two sectors are rapidly expanding (see Table 2).

*Table 6 Female employment shares by sector and industry, South Africa, 2000 and 2007*

	2000		2007	
	formal	informal	formal	informal
Agriculture, fishing etc.	34.1	48.7	41.4	63.2
Mining	2.4	18.1	7.2	-
Manufacturing	33.1	57.6	29.8	53.2
Electricity, gas, water supply	15.6	-	29.1	-
Construction	7.5	8.4	13.9	9.8
Wholesale and retail trade	45.1	59.2	47.4	59.2
Transport, storage, communication	17.2	4.8	23.6	12.1
Finance, insurance, other business	35.0	38.8	42.1	36.0
Community, social, personal serv.	57.8	59.5	57.8	62.4
Private households	-	83.5	-	74.5
Total	38.1	58.4	40.1	55.5

Source: Statistics South Africa 2009a

As for (categories of) occupations, Table 7 (next page) indicates between 2000-2009 a considerable growth in the numbers of women as well as the female share in some higher and middle categories, notably among managers (and legislators and senior officials); professionals; clerks, and to a lesser extent also among craft and related trades workers, and among plant and machine operators. After a period of rapid growth, in 2007-2009 the female share of professionals decreased abruptly, but here statistical anomalies may play a role (The 2009 figures are anyway somewhat less reliable). Between 1995-2005 women with degrees experienced the highest increase in labour force participation, followed by women with completed secondary education (a matric qualification) and then those with completed General Education and Training (GET -- DRPU 2007, 3). Focusing at top levels, according to a 2004 worldwide research project, concerning CEOs and board chairs the South African female share was with 7.1% much lower than the female share in the category managers at large. So was, with 14.7%, the country's female share of executive managers (Mathur-Helm 2005, 60).

*Table 7 Numbers of females employed \*) (headcount, x 1,000) and female employment shares by occupation, South Africa, 2000 (Sept.), 2007 (Sept.), 2009 (Apr.-June)*

	2000		2007		2009	
	x 1,000	%	x 1,000	%	x 1,000	%
Managers	169	25.3	323	31.1	325	31.8
Professionals	182	44.6	341	53.3	296	45.3
Technicians	772	55.2	820	54.7	824	53.2
Clerks	775	66.0	947	69.5	1,019	70.8
Sales and services workers	797	48.2	796	45.5	895	49.6
Skilled agricultural workers	138	37.8	50	46.7	17	20.5
Craft and related trades workers	279	16.1	345	17.4	239	13.4
Plant and machine operators	193	15.2	201	16.4	180	15.2
Elementary occupations	1,276	48.4	1,271	42.4	1,247	43.2
Domestic workers	985	96.1	927	92.4	931	96.7
Total	5,566	45.1	6,020	44.2	5,973	44.4

*Source: 2000 and 2007: Statistics South Africa 2009a; 2009: 2009b  
\*) employers, employees and self-employed*

Table 7 also shows that, though the number of female technicians (in full: technical and associate professionals, like teachers and nurses) grew, their share fell by 2%points. Both the number of female service and sales workers and their share grew recently, be it obviously in finance and other businesses and not in trade (see sections 2.6.6 and 2.6.7). The number of female skilled agricultural workers fell strongly, and recently their share decreased as well. Between 2000 and 2007, the numbers of women in elementary occupations fell both absolutely and relatively, whereas in 2007-2009 the number of men fell stronger. In line with Table 6, domestic workers initially showed the same trend, but quite recently the female number and

the female share grew. Besides domestic workers, in 2009 the share of informal labour was highest in skilled agricultural jobs (58%), elementary jobs (48%), craft and related trades (40%), and sales and services jobs (35%), and lowest among technicians (9%) and among professionals and clerks (both 8%)(SSA 2009b; a gender division is lacking).

We are now able to calculate the LPR for the target group of DECISIONS FOR LIFE, the girls and young women aged 15-29, for early 2009 on roughly 2.9 million economically active on a female population of 7.0 million (41%). Of these 2.9 million, 1.9 million may have been in formal employment and 1.0 million in informal employment (partly based on SSA 2009b, Table 3.6). As for educational level of the employed in the target group the latest available data is from in 2001. By then, 39% of the economically active females aged 15-29 (by the time nearly 2.5 million) had an educational level at ISCED levels 0, 1 and 2; 50% at levels 3 and 4, and 11% at levels 5 and 6 (based on ILO-Laborsta). We may assume that in 2009 two-thirds of the 2.9 million girls and young women, thus 1.9 million, are at least employed at ISCED 3 level. Finally we estimate, also based on our Tables 2 and 3, that of the 2.9 million girls and young women 15-29 of age in employment, recently about 1.4 million is working in urban areas in commercial services (commerce i.e. wholesale and retail trade, and finance and other business services, like tourism). It may be expected that in the next five years 300,000 to 500,000 (depending on the economic conditions) more girls and young women will enter into employment, of which about half in commercial services.

Below, we shortly describe developments in large industries with special attention to the position of women.

#### **2.6.4. Agriculture**

Unlike in other sub-Saharan countries, subsistence and small-scale farming is not dominant in South Africa, but large commercial enterprises are. If we include the various forms of agriculture, the employment share of agriculture has decreased to about 8% in 2007, by far the lowest figure on the African continent. With 7%, agriculture's contribution to female employment was even lower (our calculations, based on ILO-Laborsta). In early 2009, agriculture contributed only 2.8% to the country's GDP (SSA 2009c). The Land Act of 1913 finally resulted in 90% of the arable land being owned by white farmers by 1994. Land redistribution, aiming to have handed over 20% of that land to black farmers by 2014, until now shipwrecked because of lack of agricultural attitudes and knowledge in the black community and lack of government support (Vermaas 2009). It can be questioned anyway whether such redistribution can serve as a viable strategy for employment creation (Aliber 2003, 486). This all implies that in South Africa young women living

in cities and trying to make a career there, rarely can rely on a 'fall-back scenario' in which they are able to (temporarily) go back to their families living from agriculture.

### 2.6.5. Mining and manufacturing

Mining and manufacturing are intertwined in South Africa. South African manufacturing originated in the 1930s. It rests rather heavily on value-added processing of the country's rich mineral resources; today South Africa is the world's largest producer of platinum and chromium and the third largest producer of gold, though its world market position is weakening, investments have been postponed and the 2008-'09 crisis has heavily hit mining (Vermaas and Depuydt 2009). In the early 2000s, manufacturing companies successfully diversified into motor vehicles and parts, high value-added textiles, foodstuff, etcetera (DTI 2008). Under the GEAR program, a capital-intensive growth pattern became visible, leading to massive job-shedding in large companies (Carmody 2002, 269-271).

Reports from as varying sources as the World Bank and the trade unions have documented the trend towards outsourcing and casualisation of work in manufacturing, notably in metals and engineering, with nearly 30% of manufacturing employment still the largest sub-sector. In this sub-sector, between 1999 and 2002 the share of casual, temporary and sub-contracted labour increased from 3 to 10% of *formal* employment (ALRN 2004, 18; also: Rama in internal World Bank report, cited in Hoogeveen and Özler 2005, 4). Much casual work may have been moved to the informal sector, and it may well be that currently many women in informal employment, like in homework, are dependent on the manufacturing sector (cf. Orr 2003). Since 2000, manufacturing became a less promising source of employment for women. The influx of women, also African women, witnessed especially since the fall of apartheid (Bhorat 2000, 445), came to a standstill while overall *formal* employment grew. In 2005, the manufacturing workforce was made up of 61% Africans (men 39%, women 22%), Coloureds 15%, Indians/Asians 7%, and Whites 17% (SSA 2005b). From 2000 to 2009, the industry's male employment share increased from 63 to 67%. Yet, already in 2007 the absolute growth in male employment came to a halt, and male employment fell in two years' time by 7%, to 1,252,000 employed in April - June 2009. In the crisis women's manufacturing employment decreased somewhat less rapidly, by 5% to 621,000 employed in April - June 2009 (SSA 2009b).

### 2.6.6. Commerce

As said, between 1970-2007 commerce (wholesale and retail trade) was the largest grower in South African employment. However, the years 2007-'09 saw a serious fall in employment, of 13% to 2,962,000

employed in April – June 2009: 1,473,000 women (implying a decrease of 16% in two years' time) and 1,489,000 men (minus 10% -- SSA 2009b). Commerce has for a long time been an important source of employment for the African population, women and men alike. In 2005, Black Africans made up 71% of both the formal and the informal commerce workforce (men 34%, women 37%), Coloureds 9%, Indians/Asians 5%, and Whites 15%. By that year, 682,000 of the just over one million African women working in the sector did so in informal labour; they made up over 55% of the informal workforce in commerce (SSA 2005b). Though figures remain scarce, various informations indicate that the recent fall in commerce employment hits the African population seriously.

In the 1990s practices of casualisation and externalisation of labour accelerated in the retail sector, so that much formal employment changed into quasi-formal work. Fluctuations in demand were growingly covered through casual workers working irregular hours. Externalisation took the form of contracting out non-core services like cleaning and security, and outsourcing shelf-stacking via labour brokers. In 2003, COSATU-affiliated union SACCAWU organised a company-wide strike against managerial flexibility and casualisation practices at the Shoprite supermarket chain: a successful story of workers' mobilisation (Von Holdt and Webster 2008, 342-3). Wholesale and retail is one of the few sectors with non-statutory wage bargaining at decentralised level. SACCAWU bargains with national chains, medium-sized and small firms. By exception, bargaining has been decentralised to individual stores of a retail chain (Bhorat *et al* 2009a, 19). As we will show in section 2.8.1, the current average earnings level in the wholesale and retail industry at large, thus including repair activities and hotels and restaurants, is comparatively low.

The food retail sector continuously suffers from the country's huge income differences. The new black middle class coming up in the 2000s clearly spent their extra disposable income on non-durable items and hardly on food. Nevertheless, large food chains like Shoprite, Pick 'n Pay and Spar South Africa try to make inroads in the informal market, catering for the mass of township dwellers, actually served by street vendors, shebeens, tuck shops and spaza shops (Kuipers 2005). In terms of employment, this may merely imply a shift to (quasi)formal labour, but maybe also an improvement in job quality.

The government's 2005 ASGI-SA program identified two sub-sectors demanding special priority attention: the call centre industry and tourism. In general they seem to live up to the expectations and to fulfill their potential. As about 60% of South African call centres are linked with commercial services (Benner *et al* 2007), we will treat their perspectives in the next section. Tourist accommodation, and notably hotels and restaurants, is statistically covered by wholesale and retail, so we will treat tourism here. The rapid growth of tourism in 2004-'07 ended in the second half of 2008, and 2009 is expected to remain a slack year, with

3% growth on a GDP basis, followed by a recovery in 2010, when South Africa will organise the FIFA World Cup tournament. For 2009 the total number of jobs related to tourism in South Africa is calculated at 1,052,000, or nearly 8% of total employment. The World Travel and Tourism Council expects the long-term growth of tourism to South Africa to be an average 8.5% yearly over the coming ten years (WTTC website). If we limit ourselves to the 2010-2012 period, this prediction may imply the creation of 180,000 to 220,000 new jobs.

### **2.6.7. Services**

Business services other than commerce are booming in South Africa. As said, from 1970-2000 percent-wise employment in finance, insurance and other business grew even quicker than retail and wholesale trade – again, for men and women alike—as well as continued to grow in 2007-'09, by 18% to 1,710,000 employed in April – June 2009: 781,000 women (plus 29%) and 929,000 men (plus 10%), bringing women's share to a record 46% (SSA 2009b). In 2005, Black Africans made up 49% of the finance and other business workforce (men 32%, women 17%), Coloureds 10%, Indians/Asians 4%, and Whites 36% (men and women both 18%) (SSA 2005b).

In 2004-'05, there were already about 1,200 call centres in operation in South Africa, with nearly 100,000 employees, and ASGI-SA expected that another 100,000 jobs could be created between 2005-2009. In 2004-'05 about three-thirds of the workforce of the centres was female, and 88% of all call centre agents worked full-time. Obviously employers in this new industry try to keep unions and collective bargaining out; of the 2004 sample researched, only 23% was covered by collective bargaining, and for agents the collective bargaining wage premium was only 4% (Benner *et al* 2007). Various sources suggest a further growth in South African call centre employment of 100,000 agent positions (seats) between 2007-'12. Yet, it has to be noted that this expansion will partly 'cannibalize' on other jobs in finance, other commercial services but also in the public service, and that it will partly represent autonomous growth.

### **2.6.8. Government**

Between 1994 and 1996 government policy focused on ending racial discrimination and creating a single, unified public service for the country. 1996-1999 marked the second phase of transformation but rather than expand the public service, government put into practice the prescriptions of GEAR, leading to cuts in personnel expenditure, the outsourcing and privatization of services, and wage increases for public servants not fully covering rising consumer prices. From 2001 on, policies were marked by a degree of emphasis on

the need to strengthen the state and build capacity to deliver services, but in the course of the 2000s budgetary constraints became more pressing and employment growth for public servants remained below 5% in total. Especially in municipal services, shop floor workers recently are said to feel frustrated because of the high salaries of top officials. The distance between highest and lowest wages in public service is suggested to have grown from 20 : 1 in 1996 to 30 : 1 in 2006 (Ndungu 2008).

Throughout the 2000s, the public sector employed about 70% of those in community, social and personal services: the industry distinguished in the employment statistics. In 2005, the public sector employed about equal numbers of men and women (Bosch 2006). In that year, Black Africans made up 65% of the total community, social and personal services workforce (men 31%, women 34%), Coloureds 11%, Indians/Asians 3%, and Whites 21% (men 8% and women both 13%) (SSA 2005b). Also in 2005, the median monthly wages of the public sector employees within this industry were higher than the wages of those working in the private sector at large. Analyses of 2005 data learned that public-sector workers earned over 30% more than private-sector workers after controlling for other characteristics; this wage premium was 34% for women and 33% for men. The outcomes indicated that females earned less than their male counterparts in both the public and the private sector, after controlling for other characteristics. Yet, the results also showed that the public sector has moved faster to ensure wage equity in terms of gender and population group than the private sector (Bosch 2006, 20-4).

## **2.7. Education and skill levels of the female labour force**

### **2.7.1. Literacy**

As such, literacy does not seem a core problem, neither for South Africa as a nation nor for South African women and girls. The adult literacy rate in 1999-2006 was, according to UNDP (2008), nearly 88%, by far the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, this rate still implies that about 4.2 million adult South Africans, of which about 95% Black women and men, are not functionally literate, meaning that they can neither read nor write. Other than in elsewhere in the region, the gender gap is small or non-existent in literacy. In 1999-2006 the overall male literacy rate was 88.5%, against 86.7% overall for women, or 98% women to men parity. However, women aged 15-24 years fared even better than their male counterparts in terms of literacy. In 2007, the literacy rate for 15-24 year-olds was overall 95.4%: 94.6% for men and 96.3% for women, so

with nearly 102% women to men parity (*MDG Indicator 2.3*, derived from UN MDG Indicators and based on UNESCO data).

## Education of girls

Combined gross enrollment in South African education was in 2005 overall 77.0%, with exactly the same figure for both sexes: again, clearly the highest figure in the sub-Saharan region (UNDP 2008b).

For 2007, net enrollment in primary education (NER) was set at 91.0%, an increase compared to the 87% of 2005 (UNDP 2008b). The 2007 rate was divided as follows: boys 90.0%, girls 92.0%. Girls' enrollment remained higher than boys', with 102% women to men parity (*MDG indicator 2.1*, derived from UN MDG Indicators). According to the latest UN MDG statistics,<sup>19</sup> in the 2000s primary school enrollment of girls was consistently higher than boys'. However, the same source shows from 2000 a disquieting decrease of about 5%points in both enrollment ratios; 2000 marked the high point in enrollment, with 95.2% for boys and 96.8% for girls. The country's young women recently attained higher levels of education than the young men. Of those aged 15-25 who had *not* completed primary school (Grade 7), in 2004 women were only 39%, and of those with Grade 8 in this age group, 52% were women (SSA LFS, cited in UN 2005, 23). Since 1996, school attendance is compulsory for all children aged 7-15 years. Though attendance after 1994 increased considerably, the 2003 General Household Survey still counted about 5% of eligible children aged 7-15 years not attending primary school. Reasons for school non-attendance related to affordability, illness and far distances to the nearest school (UN 2005, 4, 19). In recent years non-attendance rates may have gone up, in line with lower enrollment.

For 2005, the gross enrollment in secondary education could be estimated at 87%, about 7%-points higher than in 1994, though the net enrollment rate stuck at 62%. Already in the 1990s surveys already showed a higher female enrollment ratio, and this continued in the 2000s, ending up in 2007 with an overall rate of 87%, divided in respectively 85% for young men and 89% for young women – implying 101% women to men parity (*MDG indicator 2.1*, derived from UN MDG Indicators and UN Data).

For 2005, the gross enrollment rate for tertiary education (number of students as a percentage of the five-year age group following on from the secondary school leaving age) was set at 15.5%: 17% for young women and just below 14% for young men (UNDP 2008b). Already by 1996, women outnumbered men in the universities, though the opposite pattern still held in the so-called technikons, now part of the universities. Yet, in 2003 49% of those enrolled at technikons were female, while 56% of all university students were

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<sup>19</sup> Not according to earlier UN statistics (cf. UN 2005, 21).

female (UN 2005, 21). And though in 1996 for tertiary education the women to men parity was still 92%, the 2001 gave an outcome of 115 women to 100 men, whereas the 2005 outcomes indicate 122 women on each 100 men.

All these figures have to be projected against the backdrop of the extremely inequitable and racist educational system the African and, to somewhat lesser extent, the Coloured and Asians/Indian population had to suffer from under the apartheid regime. For example, in the 1980s teacher : pupil ratios in primary schools averaged 1:18 in white schools, 1:24 in Asian schools, 1:27 in coloured schools and 1:39 in black schools. Whereas 96% of all teachers in white schools had teaching certificates, only 15% of black teachers were certified (wikipedia). After 1994, the ANC government has invested heavily in education, continuously spending about 20% of the budget. Schools have become less overcrowded and the physical infrastructure has improved. However, as the UN (2005) notes, the country continues to have a differentiated public schooling system with poor learning conditions especially in the poorer, rural areas. The South African Schools Act (SASA, 1996) provides for two types of schools, public and independent, and many have criticized the two-tier, allegedly largely racial, secondary education system (cf. Brookes and Hinks 2004, 577-2).

More recently, broad efforts are going on to improve the quality of learning at schools and to diminish dropout rates. In particular two programs may be instrumental here, targeting education for the poorest through fee-free schools, fully funded by the state, and the National Schools Nutrition Program. In 1999, the parliament adopted the NQF Framework. The key objective of the NQF was to create a seamless and integrated education system which would encompass learning outcomes from formal, informal and vocational sectors including the early childhood development (ECD), general education and training (GET), further education and training (FET) and higher education (HE) (website South Africa info).

### 2.7.2. Female skill levels

Since the end of apartheid, skill levels in the South African labour market have been remarkably upgraded. This is especially true for women. In 1995, less than 21% of the labour force had at least completed secondary education (Dias 2006), whereas in April-June 2009 this proportion was 45%: in formal employment 59% and in informal employment 21% (SSA 2009b). Table 8 (next page) presents for April – June 2009 an overview of the economically active (divided in employed and unemployed) and the economically not active by highest level of education<sup>20</sup>, concerning the employed and unemployment also by gender. These figures show that the South African employed women have, roughly spoken, closed the educational

<sup>20</sup> Note that these levels indicate the educational/skill levels of the workforce, *not* the skills demanded in the workplace. Statistics South Africa does not produce statistics concerning the latter.

gap with men – and even more than that. Whereas in 2009 50% of the female employed had completed secondary or tertiary education, the equivalent male share got stuck at 45.5%. Nearly 21% of the employed South African women had completed their tertiary education, 4.2%points more than the men.<sup>21</sup>

Table 8 also shows that the gap in education between employed and unemployed in South Africa is not that wide, though the conclusion of Dias (2006) for 2003, that there was hardly any gap in education left, seems somewhat exaggerated. Compared to the employed, the unemployed show an overrepresentation of those with non-completed secondary education and an underrepresentation of tertiary educated, both for women and men. Clearly, in the South African labour market completion of tertiary education enlarges job opportunities and diminished the risks of unemployment greatly. Non-completion of secondary education works the other way around. Especially among the female unemployed there seems no overrepresentation of low-educated, though retreat from the labour market in case of unemployment may play a role here. The major educational gap is the gap between the economically active, including the unemployed, and the economically not active (though for the latter we cannot specify differences by gender). While over 80% of the economically not active has less than completed secondary education, this share is 54% for the economically active. With 2.5%, the reservoir of tertiary educated among the economically inactive is rather small.

*Table 8 Highest level of education of employed and unemployed (narrow definition), by gender, and not economically not active, South Africa, 2009 (aged 15-64, April-June)*

	economically active					economically not active
	total	males		female		
		empl.	unempl.	empl.	unempl.	
no schooling	3.3	3.4	2.4	3.9	2.1	6.7
less than primary completed	9.4	10.0	11.5	8.7	7.0	14.1
primary completed	5.2	5.5	5.6	4.9	4.2	7.9
secondary not completed	36.1	34.5	45.0	31.9	45.4	52.6
secondary completed	29.8	28.9	30.7	29.1	34.3	15.5
tertiary	15.3	16.6	4.2	20.8	6.1	2.5
other	0.9	1.1	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
x 1,000	17,494	7,397	2,060	5,973	2,065	13,585

*Source: authors' calculations, based on SSA 2009b and on Labour Force Survey data put at the disposal of AIAS by Statistics South Africa*

*other = 'don't know', unspecified*

<sup>21</sup> The figures confirm the huge distance between the educational levels of the South African labour force, notably the females, and those of the economically active in the other sub-Saharan countries. For example, compare the nearly 21% of South African women with tertiary education (admittedly, in 2009) with the very low shares of highly skilled women in the female labour forces of Mozambique (0.5% in 2003) and Angola (0.9% in 2002-'03) calculated in the respective DECISIONS FOR LIFE country reports.

We have to add that Table 8 hides large differences in educational level attained across population groups. Our calculations based on Labour Force Survey 2005 data (SSA 2005b), differentiating across African and other workers (not shown), learn that the share of tertiary educated African women in employment was less than half that of such educated employed women from the other three population groups; the share of highly educated African men was even one-third of their male share in the other groups.<sup>22</sup> Remarkable is the higher educational level on average attained by African women compared to African men. By 2005 this was the case among the employed as well as the unemployed. While 14% of the employed African women had attained tertiary education, 9.5% of the employed African men had. By contrast, a considerable share of employed African women without any schooling remained (9%, against 7% males). The shares of tertiary educated among all *unemployed* African women and men were less than 3% for both, another indication that in the 2000s attaining tertiary education enlarged job opportunities for Blacks considerably. Again, non-completion of secondary education works the other way around; in 2005 this was about equally so for Blacks and for the other population groups.

## 2.8. Wages and working conditions of the target group

### 2.8.1. Wages

Tracing wages and wage inequality in South Africa over time is frustrated by a range of statistical problems. Nevertheless, the use of all available sources reveals that between at least 1995 and 1998 –and, according to some, between 1995 and 2001—overall real average earnings decreased and the distribution of earnings became more unequal. The same happened with wages and the wage distribution. The decrease of average wages worked out quite negatively for large parts of our target group. First, the young, aged 18-30, were disproportionately hit, men and women alike, though the decline was largest for women. Second, the (extra) income to be derived from (better) education remained absent for Africans. The returns to education fell dramatically for Black men and women aged 18-25, while by contrast young Whites saw pronounced increases in their return to education. Until 2000, the fact that many young Blacks obtained higher levels of education did not show up in the distribution of individual incomes. It has been suggested that the ‘jump’ in education for them was not large enough to pay out, while Coloureds, of which population group most students complete secondary education, experienced a real earnings growth in the 1990s (Casale 2004, 11;

<sup>22</sup> The detailed division according to highest level of education used in the LFS 2005 does not easily translate to the division used in Table 8.

Hoogeveen and Özler 2005, 13; Leibbrandt *et al* 2005, 35). After the turn of the century developments were less clear. In section 2.3 we discussed the outcomes of Dias (2006), suggesting that in the early 2000s a higher level of education, in particular a matric qualification, did not enhance the chances of finding work, as a perceived deterioration in the quality of the matric rendered this type of education less useful to employers in judging the future productivity of a worker. Normally this should have had negative effects on the entry-level wages of skilled workers, but statistical evidence is still lacking here.

As to give an overall picture of the earnings distribution, Table 9 shows median monthly earnings by gender, race (Africans and Whites) and occupational group. The figures date from 2001 but they are quite telling, and basically the picture has not changed in the course of the 2000s. If we compare these figures to the 2000 upper-bound poverty line, earnings turn out to be 1.6 times (African females in elementary occupations) till nearly 20 times (white male managers, legislators, and senior officials) as much as the level of that line. Earnings inequalities are clearly very large, also within occupations -- even if we include the widely varying job levels, like senior – junior differences, within occupations. In 2001, African women especially had high earnings inequality ratios, up to 4.7 in elementary occupations and 4.9 in craft and related trades workers. Between occupations earnings differences were largest among African females, with a 5.5 inequality ratio, followed by African men (5.2), White males (3.2) and White females (3.1).

The differences seem to follow closely on the skill levels required and supplied in a highly segmented labour market: tight demand for high-skilled white males and to a lesser extent females, versus an abundant supply of low-skilled African males and females. Schussler (cited in NALEDI 2008, 31) has argued that the huge disparities follow the law of supply and demand, and can be attributed to what he calls the country's 'skills crisis'-- to put it simply: not enough high-skilled, too many low-skilled. Yet, the negative roles of racial and gender discrimination cannot be left aside. Analyses on the same kind of data for 2005 showed that wage inequality was more prominent by gender and race than by industry, occupation and education (Hlekiso and Mahlo 2006). Other analyses on 2005 wage data confirmed that (higher) education in South Africa plays a very important role in determining wages. Specific educational levels of importance were a vocational education, a degree and a postgraduate degree. In both the public and private sector, having a vocational qualification contributed more towards wages than having a diploma with and/or without a matric certificate. Interestingly, it was found that a vocational qualification is more important for higher wages for females than for their male counterparts (Bosch 2006; also: Bhorat *et al* 2009a).

Table 9 Median real monthly earnings of employees (in Rands of 2000) by race, gender and occupation, South Africa, 2001 (rounded at R 20)

	Africans		Whites	
	female	male	female	male
Managers, legislators, senior officials	5,200	6,600	7,360	11,180
Professionals	5,540	6,100	7,200	12,840
Technical and associate professionals	3,500	3,560	4,960	7,300
Clerks	2,080	2,580	4,120	5,020
Service workers, shop & market sales workers	1,120	1,880	2,460	4,680
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	500	740	-	-
Craft and related trades workers	1,100	1,560	3,740	5,440
Plant and machine operators & assemblers	1,180	1,680	2,680	4,040
Elementary occupations	1,000	1,280	2,380	4,680

Source: Casale 2004, 17 (based on LFS 2001)

According to wage trends covering 2001-'09, these figures essentially still reflect the positions of the various categories. Between 1998 (or 2001) and 2005 most of the wage trends described above were reversed, especially as the share of very low-paid (earning less than R400 per month) in 1998-2005 decreased from 14 to 8.5%, while that of those earning R400-R1,200 per month increased from 22 to 31%. The real earnings of unskilled and semi-skilled workers were slightly lower in 2005 than in 1995, whereas skilled earnings increased substantially over the same period (Burger and Yu 2006). The same happened between 2001 and 2005, especially because workers with a completed postgraduate degree acquired a larger wage advantage (higher wage premium) in the labour market (Hlekiso and Mahlo 2006). Important to note is that between 1995-2005 real earnings increased most for women with degrees, and that this happened across all races. The positive effect of education on earnings grew over time, though returns to education remained significantly smaller for women than for men. This happened within each race group and at every level of education (Casale 2004; DRPU 2007). Yet, the various trends translated into growing earnings differences between population groups; against that backdrop, Table 9 may even show a too positive picture. In 2005 the real mean earnings of white males were 4.8 times those of African men and 3.0 times the mean earnings of all males, against respectively 4.7 and 2.7 in 1995. In 2005 the real mean earnings of white females were 3.1 times those of African females and 2.2 times the total mean earnings of females, against 2.6 and 1.9 in 1995 (derived from NALEDI 2008, 29). The gap between White and African women was particularly large in semi- and lower-skilled occupations (DRPU 2007, 8).

Gender wage disparities also remain quite large in South Africa. Women experienced a sharper fall in their earnings between 1995 and 1998, so that by 2005 average female earnings were still slightly below their 1995 level. Observations on trends in the gender pay gap vary. Hlekiso and Mahlo (2006) found that

between 2001-'05 gender inequality persisted and the difference between male and female wages even grew, from 31 to 38%. Based on Statistics South Africa data on average wages, Burger and Yu (2006) observed that the gender pay gap increased over 1995-2005, though since 2000 the gap has narrowed. By contrast, calculations of real mean earnings based on Department of Labour (DOL) data suggest that the gender pay gap has fallen from 41% in 1995 to 25% in 2005. In 1995, the gap between the real mean earnings of White males and White females was with 136% immense, while ten years later this gap was reduced to 45%. At the same time, the gap between earnings of African men and African women decreased from 23 to 15%, the gap between earnings of Coloured men and Coloured women decreased from 23 to 21%, and the gap between earnings of Indian/Asian men and Indian/Asian women fell from 41 to 37% (derived from Ndungu 2008, 3).

Based on *WageIndicator* data, for 2007-08 the average gender pay gap in South Africa was calculated at 33.5%, an outcome fitting in with the aforementioned results (ITUC 2009b).<sup>23</sup> The *WageIndicator* data for South Africa shows larger gender pay gaps for the youngest category of workers and again for the oldest category, both on average 39%. The gender pay gap was also larger in the private sector (average 35%) than in the public sector (27%). Across broad industry categories, the largest gender pay gaps were those in agriculture, manufacturing and building (average 36%), followed by commercial services (35%), and public sector, health care and education (31%), while with an average of 24% trade, transport and hospitality showed the lowest --albeit considerable--gap. Finally, the gender pay gap proved to be on average 9%points smaller for those covered by a collective agreement than for those who were not (ITUC 2009b, 19, 23, 28, 31).

Contrary to the wage premium found for organised African male workers in the 1990s, no such wage premium could be discerned for organised African *female* workers, at least not for 2003. In other words, for them the gender pay gap was *larger* in the union sector than in the non-union sector. An explanation for this outcome may well be that African women in unionized jobs are crowded into particular occupational categories, and within these categories, into a narrow range of jobs. In 2003, almost half of all unionized women were employed as high-skilled (associate) professionals (of which 86% teachers or nurses), in contrast to only 10% of unionized men. And unions in South Africa try, like elsewhere, to compress the wage distribution among their members, by securing higher premiums for less-skilled members (Casale and Posel 2008). Another surprising finding was that part-time workers earned per hour considerably more than full-timers. In 2003, controlled for individual and job characteristics and working conditions, this hourly wage premium to working part-time was calculated on 34 to 40%; the premium for *female* part-timers was with 33

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23 Another striking result: South Africa was the country with the highest shares of workers, both males and females, that were unhappy with their wages; for males the score was 58% dissatisfied, for females 63% (ITUC 2009b, 14).

to 40% about the same. These results suggest a 'wage floor' in part-time employment, below which wages cannot drop. It is likely that the higher hourly minimum wages for those working less than 28 hours a week (section 2.5.1) play a role here (Posel and Muller 2008, 476).<sup>24</sup>

To end this wage section, we present in Table 10 (next page) an overview of recent average gross monthly earnings by industry, in 2009 Rands and in Rands of 2000. The figures only relate to the formal economy. Both columns show that two industries, construction and wholesale and retail trade, pay by far the lowest average wages. If the total average earnings are indexed 100, then both industries' earnings are 68 (current prices) or 69 (2000 prices). With an index of 89, earnings in manufacturing are also clearly below average. At the other end of the spectrum, working in utilities is by far best paid, with an index of 203 in both columns. Comparatively well paid are also workers in transport, storage and communication (129 if total average = 100), as well as community and other services (117 respectively 121). By international comparison, with an index of 114 earnings in finance, insurance and other business services are rather modest. Obviously, there is no widespread 'bonuses culture' in South Africa. With 8.3%, the share of bonuses and overtime payments is largest in earnings in transport etc., followed by utilities (6.3%) and manufacturing (6.2%). The lowest-paying industries also showed rather low shares of bonuses and overtime payments: 4.6% in construction and 3.5% in wholesale and retail. Yet, with 3.2% this share remained also remarkably low in the finance sector; a year earlier it was 2.7% (authors' calculations, based on SSA 2009d).

*Table 10 Average gross monthly earnings of employees in formal sector (in current prices and at constant 2000 prices), including bonuses and overtime by industry, South Africa, February 2009 (rounded at R 20)*

	current prices	constant 2000 prices
Mining	10,420	6,280
Manufacturing	8,560	5,160
Utilities	19,480	11,740
Construction	6,560	3,960
Wholesale and retail trade	6,560	3,960
Transport, storage, communication	12,380	7,460
Finance, insurance, other business services	10,920	6,580
Community, social, personal services	11,140	6,700
Total formal (excl. agriculture)	9,600	5,780

Source: SSA 2009d

24 According to official statistics the incidence of part-time work is rather limited in South Africa. In April–June 2009, 23% of the employed women and 10% of the employed men worked less than 40 hours per week (SSA 2009b).

### 2.8.2. Working conditions

Attention to working conditions, and notably to occupational health and safety, gained momentum in South Africa with the new legislation of the 1990s. This was especially true for the industry with the most dramatic working conditions, i.e. mining, where the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) played a major role in the coming into being of the Mine Health and Safety Act. However, under the GEAR strategy health and safety enforcement agencies were weakened, resulting in poor compliance with legislation, particularly in the non-mining industries. Statistics on occupational accidents and diseases are outdated; events as such are generally underreported (Ryan 2007). According to both South African experts and statistics, the most pressing occupational health and safety problems include: 1. tuberculosis, particularly resistant TB among health care workers and among miners and other silica-exposed workers; 2. injuries among miners; 3. falls and transport accidents among construction and agricultural workers; 4. ergonomic problems (Ryan 2007, 33; NALEDI 2008, 19-22).

A specific working conditions issue is that of working hours. Official statistics indicate a wide incidence in South Africa of very long working weeks. In April–June 2009, 25% of all employed women and 35% of the employed men worked more than 45 hours per week. Though the crisis has a clear influence in shortening long working weeks, in one year by about 4%-points for men and women alike (in April-June 2008, 29% of women and 39% of men weekly worked over 45 hours -- SSA 2009b), extremely long hours continue to demand trade union attention.

### 2.8.3. Indications of employers' HR practices

Undoubtedly, the major challenge in the Human Resource (HR) policies of South African companies and civil service bodies is the need to overcome the apartheid legacy and to move from discriminatory practices, including the strategic underpinning of employment equity, fair pay and skills development (Horwitz *et al* 2002). Some early accounts hardly find any progress in this field, and state that in the first few years affirmative action measures have had hardly or no real effects, definitely for Black women (Brookes and Hinks 2004; Mathur-Helm 2005). Studies argue that in South Africa affirmative action has been primarily used to readdress racial inconsistency in the workplace, and that it so far benefited mainly the advancement of black males, thus neglecting Asians, Coloureds and white females. Yet, in the early 2000s white females outnumbered black females in top management positions by a three to one ratio, and in lower managerial positions by a four to one ratio. It seems clear that in management ranks white women are benefiting much more than black women from gender equity programs (Horwitz *et al* 2002, 1107; Mathur-Helm 2005, 67).

The chairman of the Commission for Employment Equality (CEE) has repeatedly concluded that the government's approach of persuasion of employers obviously does not have the desired effect, with black and coloured people bearing the brunt of it. The Labour Minister most recently agreed that the figures showed a "disturbing trend". The 2009 EEA report showed that white men represented 61% of top management in both the private and the government sector, black men 10%, Indian men 5%, and coloured men 4%, while white women represented 12%, black women just less than 4%, and Indian and coloured women each just more than 1%. In government alone, blacks had a 61% share (Williams 2009).

Major companies active in South Africa, especially in export industries, show a development towards the adoption of new Human Resource Management (HRM) strategies, applying a range of forms of functional flexibility and employee participation. More common in South African subsidiaries of multinationals than in domestic firms are high-performance work organisations (Horwitz and Smith 1998). Striking is the finding that such –in capitalist perspective—advanced HR practices do not interfere with the deployment of trade union power in the workplace. In many cases where employee participation has been infused, unions retained a strong presence. The main area of conflict seems pay; performance-related pay and the like remained unpopular among trade unionists (Wood and Glaister 2008).



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## 3. Basic information for WageIndicator questionnaire

### 3.1. Introduction

Preparations for the DECISIONS FOR LIFE Activities 1.03a and 1.03b have resulted in a number of lists, grouped in this Chapter and to be used in the WageIndicator web-survey for country-specific questions and their analyses. This basic information can be used on-line, but if needed also off-line. The lists contain information on South African trade unions (section 3.2), educational categories and ISCED levels (3.3), regions (3.4), racial groups (3.5.1) and languages (3.5.2).

### 3.2. List of trade unions

The country's trade union movement has already been introduced under Labour relations (section 2.3), section. Below, a list, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found of the larger trade unions and all those union affiliated to a national trade union confederation. We did not list the large number (over 100) of very small independent trade unions, including unions only operating in one or two provinces.

Table 11 List of trade unions in South Africa (by 1/1/2009)

pt_ZA	pt_ZA	Source label	Translation	Translation
710400	710401	ZAF Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union (CEPPWAWU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union (CEPPWAWU)
710400	710402	ZAF Communication Workers' Union (CWU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	Communication Workers' Union (CWU)
710400	710404	ZAF Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA)
710400	710420	ZAF The Finance Union (SASBO)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	The Finance Union (SASBO)
710400	710403	ZAF Food and Allied Workers' Union (FAWU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	Food and Allied Workers' Union (FAWU)
710400	710405	ZAF Musicians Union of South Africa (MUSA)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	ZAF Musicians Union of South Africa (MUSA)
710400	710406	ZAF National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (NEHAWU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union (NEHAWU)
710400	710408	ZAF National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA)
710400	710409	ZAF Performing Arts Workers' Equity (PAWE)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	Performing Arts Workers' Equity (PAWE)
710400	710410	ZAF Police and Prison Civil Rights Union (POPCRU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	Police and Prison Civil Rights Union (POPCRU)
710400	710411	ZAF South African Agricultural Plantation and Allied Workers' Union (SAAPAWU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	South African Agricultural Plantation and Allied Workers' Union (SAAPAWU)
710400	710414	ZAF South African Democratic Nurses' Union (SADNU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	South African Democratic Nurses' Union (SADNU)
710400	710415	ZAF South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU)
710400	710416	ZAF South African Football Players' Union (SAFPU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	South African Football Players' Union (SAFPU)
710400	710417	ZAF South African Medical Association (SAMA)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	South African Medical Association (SAMA)
710400	710418	ZAF South African Municipal Workers' Union (SAMWU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	South African Municipal Workers' Union (SAMWU)

710400	710419	ZAF South African State and Allied Workers' Union (SASAWU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	South African State and Allied Workers' Union (SASAWU)
710400	710421	ZAF South African Transport and Allied Workers' Union (SATAWU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	South African Transport and Allied Workers' Union (SATAWU)
710400	710413	ZAF Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (SACTWU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (SACTWU)
710400	710407	ZAF National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)
710400	710412	ZAF South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (SACCAWU)	Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	South African Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers' Union (SACCAWU)
710422	710423	ZAF Airline Pilots Association of South Africa (ALPA-SA)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Airline Pilots Association of South Africa (ALPA-SA)
710422	710424	ZAF Care Centre, Catering, Retail & Allied Workers' Union (CCRAWUSA)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Care Centre, Catering, Retail & Allied Workers' Union (CCRAWUSA)
710422	710425	ZAF Construction & Engineering Industrial Workers' Union (CEIWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Construction & Engineering Industrial Workers' Union (CEIWU)
710422	710455	ZAF Banking, Insurance, Finance and Assurance Workers' Union (BIFAWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Banking, Insurance, Finance and Assurance Workers' Union (BIFAWU)
710422	710454	ZAF Building, Construction and Allied Workers' union (BCAWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Building, Construction and Allied Workers' union (BCAWU)
710422	710427	ZAF Health and Other Services Personnel Trade Union of South Africa (HOSPERSA)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Health and Other Services Personnel Trade Union of South Africa (HOSPERSA)
710422	710456	ZAF Hotel, Liquor, Catering, Commercial and Allied Workers (HOTELICCA)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Hotel, Liquor, Catering, Commercial and Allied Workers (HOTELICCA)
710422	710428	ZAF Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU)
710422	710429	ZAF Insurance and Banking Staff Association (IBSA)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Insurance and Banking Staff Association (IBSA)
710422	710430	ZAF International Staff Association (ISA)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	International Staff Association (ISA)
710422	710431	ZAF Jewellers & Goldsmiths Union (J&GU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Jewellers & Goldsmiths Union (J&GU)
710422	710460	ZAF Media Workers Association of South Africa (MWA-SA)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Media Workers Association of South Africa (MWA-SA)

710422	710422	ZAF Metal and Electrical Workers Union of South Africa (MEWUSA)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Metal and Electrical Workers Union of South Africa (MEWUSA)
710422	710432	ZAF Millenium Workers' Union (MWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Millenium Workers' Union
710422	710433	ZAF Motor Transport Workers' Union (MPWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Motor Transport Workers' Union (MPWU)
710422	710457	ZAF Municipal, Education, State, Health and allied Workers Union (MESHAWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Municipal, Education, State, Health and allied Workers Union (MESHAWU)
710422	710434	ZAF National Democratic Change & Allied Workers' Union (NDCAWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	National Democratic Change & Allied Workers' Union (NDCAWU)
710422	710461	ZAF National Security & Unqualified Workers' Union (NASAWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	National Security & Unqualified Workers' Union (NASAWU)
710422	710459	ZAF National Services and Allied Workers Union (NSAWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	National Services and Allied Workers Union (NSAWU)
710422	710436	ZAF National Teachers' Union (NATU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	National Teachers' Union (NATU)
710422	710464	ZAF National Union of Food, Beverage, Spirits, Alcohol and Wine (NUFBSAW)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	National Union of Food, Beverage, Spirits, Alcohol and Wine (NUFBSAW)
710422	710463	ZAF National Union of Furniture and Allied Workers (NUFAW)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	National Union of Furniture and Allied Workers (NUFAW)
710422	710438	ZAF National Union of Leather and Allied Workers (NULAW)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	National Union of Leather and Allied Workers (NULAW)
710422	710462	ZAF National, Liquor and Catering Trade Union (NLCTU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	National, Liquor and Catering Trade Union (NLCTU)
710422	710439	ZAF Professional Transport Workers' Union (PTWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Professional Transport Workers' Union (PTWU)
710422	710440	ZAF Public Servants' Association of South Africa (PSASA)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Public Servants' Association of South Africa (PSASA)
710422	710465	ZAF South African Chemical Workers Union (SACWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	South African Chemical Workers Union (SACWU)
710422	710441	ZAF South African Communications Union (SACU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	South African Communications Union (SACU)
710422	710442	ZAF South African Parastatal & Tertiary Institutions Union (SAPTU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	South African Parastatal & Tertiary Institutions Union (SAPTU)

710422	710444	ZAF Suid-Afrikaanse Onderwysersunie (SAOU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	South African Teachers' Union (SAOU)
710422	710443	ZAF South African Typographical Union (SATU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	South African Typographical Union (SATU)
710422	710466	ZAF Transport and Omnibus workers Union (TOWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Transport and Omnibus Workers Union (TOWU)
710422	710445	ZAF United Association of South Africa (UASA)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	United Association of South Africa (UASA)
710422	710446	ZAF United National Public Servants Association of South Africa and Allied Workers Union (UNIPSAWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	United National Public Servants Association of South Africa and Allied Workers Union (UNIPSAWU)
710422	710447	ZAF United Private Sector Workers Union (UPSWU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	United Private Sector Workers Union (UPSWU)
710422	710448	ZAF United Transport and Allied Workers' Union (UTATU)	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	United Transport and Allied Workers' Union (UTATU)
710422	710452	ZAF Other	South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACOTU)	Other
710485	710474	ZAF National Construction Building and Allied Workers' Union (NACBAWU)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	National Construction Building and Allied Workers' Union (NACBAWU)
710485	710467	ZAF Building, Wood and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa (BWAUSA)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Building, Wood and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa (BWAUSA)
710485	710468	ZAF Brick & General Workers' Union (B&GWU)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Brick & General Workers' Union (B&GWU)
710485	710469	ZAF Building Workers' Union (BWU)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Building Workers' Union (BWU)
710485	710470	ZAF Commercial Workers' Union of South Africa (CUSA)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Commercial Workers' Union of South Africa (CUSA)
710485	710471	ZAF Federal Council of Retail and Allied Workers (FEDCRAW)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Federal Council of Retail and Allied Workers (FEDCRAW)
710485	710472	ZAF Food, Cleaning and Security Workers' Union (FOCSWU)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Food, Cleaning and Security Workers' Union (FOCSWU)
710485	710473	ZAF Mine, Engineering and Distributor Workers' Union of South Africa (MEDWUSA)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Mine, Engineering and Distributor Workers' Union of South Africa (MEDWUSA)

710485	710403	ZAF National Certified Fishing and Allied Workers' Union (NACFAWU)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	National Certified Fishing and Allied Workers' Union (NACFAWU)
710485	710475	ZAF National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers (NUPSAW)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers (NUPSAW)
710485	710476	ZAF Professional Educators' Union (PEU)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Professional Educators' Union (PEU)
710485	710477	ZAF Progressive General Employees' Association of South Africa (PGEASA)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Progressive General Employees' Association of South Africa (PGEASA)
710485	710450	ZAF Solidarity	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Solidarity
710485	710478	ZAF South African Building and Allied Workers' Organization (SABAWO)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	South African Building and Allied Workers' Organization (SABAWO)
710485	710479	ZAF South African Food, Retail and Agricultural Workers' Union (SAFRAWU)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	South African Food, Retail and Agricultural Workers' Union (SAFRAWU)
710485	710481	ZAF Transport Action, Retail & General Workers' Union (THOR)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Transport Action, Retail & General Workers' Union (THOR)
710485	710480	ZAF Trawler & Line Fishermen's Union (TALFU)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Trawler & Line Fishermen's Union (TALFU)
710485	710481	ZAF Westcoast Workers' Union (WWU)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Westcoast Workers' Union (WWU)
710485	710483	ZAF Workers' Labour Council – South Africa (WCL-SA)	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Workers' Labour Council – South Africa (WCL-SA)
710485	710484	ZAF Other	Confederation of South African Workers' Unions (CONSAWU)	Other
710486		ZAF Association of Metal, Iron and General Workers' Union (AMIGWU)	--	Association of Metal, Iron and General Workers' Union (AMIGWU)
710487		ZAF National Union Tertiary Employees South Africa (NUTESA)/National Tertiary Staff Union (NTESU)	--	National Union Tertiary Employees South Africa (NUTESA)/National Tertiary Staff Union (NTESU)
710488		ZAF South African Domestic and General Workers Union (SADAGWU)	--	South African Domestic and General Workers Union (SADAGWU)
710499		ZAF Other not listed	--	Other not listed

### 3.3. List of educational categories and ISCED levels

Below, a full list of the educational categories used in South Africa, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

Table 12 List of educational categories in South Africa (by 1/1/2009)

pt_ZA	Source label	Translation	ISCED
710210	ZAF No education / schooling	No education / schooling	0
710233	ZAF No formal education but Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET)	No formal education but Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET)	1
710234	ZAF Some formal education plus Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET)	Some formal education plus Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET)	1
710211	ZAF Grade R (0)	Grade R (0)	1
710212	ZAF Grade 1 / Sub A	Grade 1 / Sub A	1
710213	ZAF Grade 2 / Sub B	Grade 2 / Sub B	1
710214	ZAF Grade 3 / Standard 1	Grade 3 / Standard 1	1
710215	ZAF Grade 4 / Standard 2	Grade 4 / Standard 2	1
710216	ZAF Grade 5 / Standard 3	Grade 5 / Standard 3	1
710217	ZAF Grade 6 / Standard 4	Grade 6 / Standard 4	1
710218	ZAF Grade 7 / Standard 5	Grade 7 / Standard 5	1
710219	ZAF Grade 8 / Standard 6 / Form 1	Grade 8 / Standard 6 / Form 1	2
710220	ZAF Grade 9/1/ Standard 7 / Form 2	Grade 9/1/ Standard 7 / Form 2	2
710221	ZAF Grade 10 / Standard 8 / Form 3	Grade 10 / Standard 8 / Form 3	3
710222	ZAF Grade 11 / Standard 9 / Form 4	Grade 11 / Standard 9 / Form 4	3
710223	ZAF Grade 12 / Standard 10 / Form 5	Grade 12 / Standard 10 / Form 5	3
710224	ZAF NTC I	NTC I	4
710225	ZAF NTC II	NTC II	4
710226	ZAF NTC III	NTC III	4
710227	ZAF Diploma	Diploma	5
710228	ZAF Bachelor's Degree	Bachelor's Degree	5
710229	ZAF Honours Degree	Honours Degree	6
710231	ZAF Masters	Masters	6
710232	ZAF Doctorate	Doctorate	6

### 3.4. List of regions

Below, a full draft list of all South African regions, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

Table 13 List of regions in South Africa (by 10/16/2008)

pt_ZA	pt_ZA	Source label		Translation	Translation
7100100000	7100100131	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Alice	Eastern Cape	Alice
7100100000	7100100231	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Barkly East	Eastern Cape	Barkly East
7100100000	7100100331	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Bizana	Eastern Cape	Bizana
7100100000	7100100431	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Cofimvaba	Eastern Cape	Cofimvaba
7100100000	7100100501	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape East London	Eastern Cape	East London
7100100000	7100100631	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Engcobo	Eastern Cape	Engcobo
7100100000	7100100731	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Flagstaff	Eastern Cape	Flagstaff
7100100000	7100100831	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Gcuwa	Eastern Cape	Gcuwa
7100100000	7100100931	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Idutywa	Eastern Cape	Idutywa
7100100000	7100101031	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Lady Frere	Eastern Cape	Lady Frere
7100100000	7100101131	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Libode	Eastern Cape	Libode
7100100000	7100101231	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Mount Ayliff	Eastern Cape	Mount Ayliff
7100100000	7100101331	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Mount Fletcher	Eastern Cape	Mount Fletcher
7100100000	7100101431	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Mthatha	Eastern Cape	Mthatha
7100100000	7100101531	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Ntabankulu	Eastern Cape	Ntabankulu
7100100000	7100101601	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Port Elizabeth	Eastern Cape	Port Elizabeth
7100100000	7100101731	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Port St Johns	Eastern Cape	Port St Johns
7100100000	7100101831	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Queenstown	Eastern Cape	Queenstown
7100100000	7100101931	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Qumbu	Eastern Cape	Qumbu
7100100000	7100102031	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Stutterheim	Eastern Cape	Stutterheim
7100100000	7100102131	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Umzimkhulu	Eastern Cape	Umzimkhulu
7100100000	7100109531	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Another city with 100,000 inhabitants or more	Eastern Cape	Another city with 100,000 inhabitants or more
7100100000	7100109632	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants	Eastern Cape	A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants
7100100000	7100109704	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants	Eastern Cape	A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants
7100100000	7100109805	ZAF Eastern Cape	ZAF Eastern Cape Rural area	Eastern Cape	Rural area
7100200000	7100200131	ZAF Free State	ZAF Free State Bethlehem	Free State	Bethlehem
7100200000	7100200231	ZAF Free State	ZAF Free State Bloemfontein	Free State	Bloemfontein
7100200000	7100200331	ZAF Free State	ZAF Free State Kroonstad	Free State	Kroonstad
7100200000	7100200431	ZAF Free State	ZAF Free State Parys	Free State	Parys
7100200000	7100200531	ZAF Free State	ZAF Free State Qwa-Qwa	Free State	Qwa-Qwa
7100200000	7100200631	ZAF Free State	ZAF Free State Sasolburg	Free State	Sasolburg

7100200000	7100200731	ZAF Free State	ZAF Free State Senekal	Free State	Senekal
7100200000	7100200831	ZAF Free State	ZAF Free State Welkom	Free State	Welkom
7100200000	7100209632	ZAF Free State	ZAF Free State A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants	Free State	A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants
7100200000	7100209704	ZAF Free State	ZAF Free State A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants	Free State	A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants
7100200000	7100209805	ZAF Free State	ZAF Free State Rural area	Free State	Rural area
7100300000	7100300131	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng Bronkhorstspuit	Gauteng	Bronkhorstspuit
7100300000	7100300231	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng Carletonville	Gauteng	Carletonville
7100300000	7100300307	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng East Rand	Gauteng	East Rand
7100300000	7100300407	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng Johannesburg	Gauteng	Johannesburg
7100300000	7100300531	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng Krugersdorp	Gauteng	Krugersdorp
7100300000	7100300607	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng Pretoria	Gauteng	Pretoria
7100300000	7100300731	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng Randfontein	Gauteng	Randfontein
7100300000	7100300831	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng Vereeniging	Gauteng	Vereeniging
7100300000	7100300931	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng Westonaria	Gauteng	Westonaria
7100300000	7100300632	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants	Gauteng	A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants
7100300000	7100300704	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants	Gauteng	A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants
7100300000	7100300805	ZAF Gauteng	ZAF Gauteng Rural area	Gauteng	Rural area
7100400000	7100400131	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Bergville	KwaZulu-Natal	Bergville
7100400000	7100400307	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Durban	KwaZulu-Natal	Durban
7100400000	7100400531	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Emangusi	KwaZulu-Natal	Emangusi
7100400000	7100400631	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Eshowe	KwaZulu-Natal	Eshowe
7100400000	7100400831	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Ladysmith	KwaZulu-Natal	Ladysmith
7100400000	7100401331	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Mkuze	KwaZulu-Natal	Mkuze
7100400000	7100401431	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Ndwedwe	KwaZulu-Natal	Ndwedwe
7100400000	7100401531	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Newcastle	KwaZulu-Natal	Newcastle
7100400000	7100401631	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Nkandla	KwaZulu-Natal	Nkandla
7100400000	7100401731	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Nongoma	KwaZulu-Natal	Nongoma
7100400000	7100401831	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Nqutu	KwaZulu-Natal	Nqutu
7100400000	7100401931	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Pietermaritzburg	KwaZulu-Natal	Pietermaritzburg

7100400000	7100402031	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Pomoroy	KwaZulu-Natal	Pomoroy
7100400000	7100402231	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Port Shepstone	KwaZulu-Natal	Port Shepstone
7100400000	7100402331	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Richards Bay	KwaZulu-Natal	Richards Bay
7100400000	7100402431	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Somekele	KwaZulu-Natal	Somekele
7100400000	7100402531	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Stanger	KwaZulu-Natal	Stanger
7100400000	7100402631	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Ulundi	KwaZulu-Natal	Ulundi
7100400000	7100402731	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Umzumbe	KwaZulu-Natal	Umzumbe
7100400000	7100402831	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Vryheid	KwaZulu-Natal	Vryheid
7100400000	7100409531	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Another city with 100,000 inhabitants or more	KwaZulu-Natal	Another city with 100,000 inhabitants or more
7100400000	7100409632	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants	KwaZulu-Natal	A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants
7100400000	7100409704	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants	KwaZulu-Natal	A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants
7100400000	7100409805	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal	ZAF KwaZulu-Natal Rural area	KwaZulu-Natal	Rural area
7100800000	7100800131	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Bochum	Limpopo	Bochum
7100800000	7100800231	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Burgersfort	Limpopo	Burgersfort
7100800000	7100800331	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Dendron	Limpopo	Dendron
7100800000	7100800431	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Duiwelsklook	Limpopo	Duiwelsklook
7100800000	7100800531	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Greater Giyani	Limpopo	Greater Giyani
7100800000	7100800631	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Greater Groblersdal	Limpopo	Greater Groblersdal
7100800000	7100800731	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Greater Tzaneen	Limpopo	Greater Tzaneen
7100800000	7100800831	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Lebowakgomop	Limpopo	Lebowakgomop
7100800000	7100800931	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Louis Trichardt	Limpopo	Louis Trichardt
7100800000	7100801031	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Moletji	Limpopo	Moletji
7100800000	7100801131	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Ngwaritsi	Limpopo	Ngwaritsi
7100800000	7100801231	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Phalaborwa	Limpopo	Phalaborwa
7100800000	7100801331	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Polokwane	Limpopo	Polokwane
7100800000	7100801431	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Potgietersrus	Limpopo	Potgietersrus
7100800000	7100801531	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Thohoyandou	Limpopo	Thohoyandou
7100800000	7100809631	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants	Limpopo	A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants
7100800000	7100809704	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants	Limpopo	A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants

7100800000	7100809805	ZAF Limpopo	ZAF Limpopo Rural area	Limpopo	Rural area
7100500000	7100500131	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Bushbuckridge	Mpumalanga	Bushbuckridge
7100500000	7100500231	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Carolina	Mpumalanga	Carolina
7100500000	7100500331	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Ermelo	Mpumalanga	Ermelo
7100500000	7100500431	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Greater Marble Hall	Mpumalanga	Greater Marble Hall
7100500000	7100500531	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Highveld Ridge	Mpumalanga	Highveld Ridge
7100500000	7100500631	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga KwaMhlanga	Mpumalanga	KwaMhlanga
7100500000	7100500731	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Mdutjana	Mpumalanga	Mdutjana
7100500000	7100500831	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Middelburg	Mpumalanga	Middelburg
7100500000	7100500931	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Nelspruit	Mpumalanga	Nelspruit
7100500000	7100501031	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Nkomazi	Mpumalanga	Nkomazi
7100500000	7100501131	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Piet Retief	Mpumalanga	Piet Retief
7100500000	7100501231	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Standerton	Mpumalanga	Standerton
7100500000	7100501331	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Witbank	Mpumalanga	Witbank
7100500000	7100509632	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants	Mpumalanga	A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants
7100500000	7100509704	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants	Mpumalanga	A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants
7100500000	7100509805	ZAF Mpumalanga	ZAF Mpumalanga Rural area	Mpumalanga	Rural area
7100600000	7100600131	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Brits	North West	Brits
7100600000	7100600231	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Delareyville	North West	Delareyville
7100600000	7100600331	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Klerksdorp	North West	Klerksdorp
7100600000	7100600431	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Lichtenburg	North West	Lichtenburg
7100600000	7100600531	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Mafikeng	North West	Mafikeng
7100600000	7100600631	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Mogwase	North West	Mogwase
7100600000	7100600731	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Potchefstroom	North West	Potchefstroom
7100600000	7100600831	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Reivilo	North West	Reivilo
7100600000	7100600931	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Rustenburg	North West	Rustenburg
7100600000	7100601031	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Setla-Kgobi	North West	Setla-Kgobi
7100600000	7100601131	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Temba	North West	Temba
7100600000	7100601231	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Zeerust	North West	Zeerust
7100600000	7100609632	ZAF North West	ZAF North West A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants	North West	A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants
7100600000	7100609704	ZAF North West	ZAF North West A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants	North West	A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants
7100600000	7100609805	ZAF North West	ZAF North West Rural area	North West	Rural area
7100700000	7100700131	ZAF Northern Cape	ZAF Northern Cape Kimberley	Northern Cape	Kimberley
7100700000	7100700232	ZAF Northern Cape	ZAF Northern Cape Springbok	Northern Cape	Springbok

7100700000	7100700323	ZAF Northern Cape	ZAF Northern Cape Sutherland	Northern Cape	Sutherland
7100700000	7100709632	ZAF Northern Cape	ZAF Northern Cape A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants	Northern Cape	A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants
7100700000	7100709704	ZAF Northern Cape	ZAF Northern Cape A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants	Northern Cape	A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants
7100700000	7100709805	ZAF Northern Cape	ZAF Northern Cape Rural area	Northern Cape	Rural area
7100900000	7100900707	ZAF Western Cape	ZAF Western Cape Cape Town	Western Cape	Cape Town
7100900000	7100900831	ZAF Western Cape	ZAF Western Cape George	Western Cape	George
7100900000	7100900932	ZAF Western Cape	ZAF Western Cape Oudtshoorn	Western Cape	Oudtshoorn
7100900000	7100901031	ZAF Western Cape	ZAF Western Cape Paarl	Western Cape	Paarl
7100900000	7100901131	ZAF Western Cape	ZAF Western Cape Stellenbosch	Western Cape	Stellenbosch
7100900000	7100901232	ZAF Western Cape	ZAF Western Cape Swellendam	Western Cape	Swellendam
7100900000	7100901331	ZAF Western Cape	ZAF Western Cape Worcester	Western Cape	Worcester
7100900000	7100909632	ZAF Western Cape	ZAF Western Cape A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants	Western Cape	A small city with 10,000 - 100,000 inhabitants
7100900000	7100909704	ZAF Western Cape	ZAF Western Cape A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants	Western Cape	A village with less than 10,000 inhabitants
7100900000	7100909805	ZAF Western Cape	ZAF Western Cape Rural area	Western Cape	Rural area
7109990000	7109990072	ZAF Abroad	ZAF Abroad Botswana	Abroad	Botswana
7109990000	7109990426	ZAF Abroad	ZAF Abroad Lesotho	Abroad	Lesotho
7109990000	7109990508	ZAF Abroad	ZAF Abroad Mozambique	Abroad	Mozambique
7109990000	7109990516	ZAF Abroad	ZAF Abroad Namibia	Abroad	Namibia
7109990000	7109990716	ZAF Abroad	ZAF Abroad Zimbabwe	Abroad	Zimbabwe
7109990000	7109990748	ZAF Abroad	ZAF Abroad Swaziland	Abroad	Swaziland
7109990000	7109990999	ZAF Abroad	ZAF Abroad Other country	Abroad	Other country

## 3.5. Lists of racial groups and languages

### 3.5.1. Racial groups

Unlike for other countries and in other DECISIONS FOR LIFE country reports, we adapted the phrasing in this section according to the South African (statistical) standards, and listed racial group instead of ethnicity.

Table 14 List of racial groups in South Africa (by 1/1/2009)

pt_ZA	Source label	Translation
710001	ZAF African	African
710002	ZAF White	White
710003	ZAF Coloured	Coloured
710004	ZAF Asian/Indian	Asian/Indian
710999	ZAF Other	Other
710998	ZAF Not applicable	Not applicable

### 3.5.2. Languages

There are 11 official languages in South Africa. Below, a draft list of these languages, designed for use in the web-survey, can be found.

Table 15 List of languages in South Africa (by 1/1/2009)

pt_ZA	Source label	Translation
710092	ZAF English	English
710100	ZAF IsiXhosa	siXhosa
710101	ZAF IsiZulu	IsiZulu
710091	ZAF Afrikaans	Afrikaans
710095	ZAF SeSotho	SeSotho
710093	ZAF IsiNdebele	IsiNdebele
710094	ZAF Sepedi / Sesotho sa Leboa (Northern Sotho)	Sepedi / Sesotho sa Leboa (Northern Sotho)
710096	ZAF IsiSwathi	IsiSwathi
710097	ZAF IsiTsonga	IsiTsonga
710098	ZAF SeTswana	SeTswana
710099	ZAF Tshivenda	Tshivenda
710999	ZAF Other language	Other



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# What is WageIndicator?

WageIndicator has websites in 50 countries. In every country, a national website has a free Salary Check. This Check provides detailed information about the wages, on average earned in a wide range of occupations, taken into account personal characteristics, such as tenure/age, education, supervisory position, region and alike.

Apart from the Salary Check, the websites in many countries have attractive web-tools, such as Minimum Wage Checks, DecentWorkCheck, Gross-Net Earnings Check, and alike. In addition, most websites have content about wages, working conditions, labour standards and related topics. Each country has at least one website. Multilingual countries have two or more websites. In addition, many countries have websites for target groups, for example women or youth. The project website is [www.wageindicator.org](http://www.wageindicator.org).

Worldwide, the national WageIndicator websites attract large numbers of web-visitors; in 2007 in total more than 10 million. The websites are consulted by workers for their job mobility decisions, annual performance talks or wage negotiations. They are consulted by school pupils, students or re-entrant women facing occupational choices, or by employers in small and medium sized companies when recruiting staff or negotiating wages with their employees.

In return for all free information provided, the web-visitors are encouraged to complete a web-survey, which takes 10 to 20 minutes. The survey has detailed questions about earnings, benefits, working conditions, employment contract, training, as well as questions about education, occupation, industry, and household characteristics. This web-survey is comparable across all countries. The web-survey is continuously posted at all WageIndicator websites, of course in the national language(s) and adapted to country-specific issues, where needed. The data from the web-survey are used for the calculations, underlying the Salary Check. For occupations with at least 50 observations in the national database a salary indication can be calculated. The Salary Checks are updated annually.

The project started in 2000 in the Netherlands with a large-scale, paper-based survey to collect data on women's wages. In 2001 the first WageIndicator website with a Salary Check and a web-survey was launched. Since 2004, websites were launched in European countries, in North and South America, in South-Africa, and in countries in Asia. All large economies of the world currently have a WageIndicator website, among which the USA, the Russian Federation, China, India and Brazil. From 2009 onwards, websites will be launched in more African countries, as well as in Indonesia and in a number of post-soviet countries. More information about the WageIndicator Foundation and its activities can be found at [www.wageindicator.org](http://www.wageindicator.org).



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
## Information about AIAS

AIAS is a young interdisciplinary institute, established in 1998, aiming to become the leading expert centre in the Netherlands for research on industrial relations, organisation of work, wage formation and labour market inequalities. As a network organisation, AIAS brings together high-level expertise at the University of Amsterdam from five disciplines:

- Law
- Economics
- Sociology
- Psychology
- Health and safety studies

AIAS provides both teaching and research. On the teaching side it offers a Masters in Comparative Labour and Organisation Studies and one in Human Resource Management. In addition, it organizes special courses in co-operation with other organisations such as the Netherlands Centre for Social Innovation (NCSI), the Netherlands Institute for Small and Medium-sized Companies (MKB-Nederland), the National Centre for Industrial Relations 'De Burcht', the National Institute for Co-determination (GBIO), and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. AIAS has an extensive research program (2004-2008) on Institutions, Inequalities and Internationalisation, building on the research performed by its member scholars. Current research themes effectively include:

- Wage formation, social policy and industrial relations
- The cycles of policy learning and mimicking in labour market reforms in Europe
- The distribution of responsibility between the state and the market in social security
- The wage-indicator and world-wide comparison of employment conditions
- The projects of the LoWER network



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